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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Leibniz: A Metaphysic of Substances. (May 2006) 
Mark Christopher Bernier, B.A., Rhode Island College 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Stephen Daniel 
 
 
 
 For Leibniz, corporeal substance is the union of body and soul, and he dedicates 
much of his thought to understanding the mystery of this union. However, there is a 
divide among scholars over what he proposes as a solution. Many have judged that for 
Leibniz there are no bodies "out there" in a world independent of the mind. There is, in 
fact, no world outside of perceiving things and their appearances. This is taken to imply 
that corporeal substances are (at most) the logical relations underlying phenomena; they 
would not then be real substances. 
Another interpretation is that young Leibniz believes in corporeal substance, but 
mature Leibniz recognizes that their reality cannot be maintained. It is in his "later years" 
that he finally comes to embrace hard-core phenomenalist commitments, eschewing the 
material world as nothing but phantasmagoria. Leibniz has changed his mind, on this 
account, and corporeal substances are real only in his "middle years." 
I believe that these interpretations are incorrect, and I attempt to show two things. 
First, Leibniz holds to real corporeal substances (i.e., they are not merely logical grouping 
of monads). Establishing this involves scrutinizing the textual evidence, both for and 
against this position. Second, Leibniz has the resources to account for the true unity of 
 iv 
      
corporeal substance. At the heart of Leibniz's metaphysics are the twin themes of unity 
and harmony, which permeate every facet of his thought. They are the keys to 
understanding what is real, and what is not. A true substance, for Leibniz, is that which 
has true unity, and I believe that the unity of a corporeal substance can be explained only 
through the harmony of its elements. In short, its harmony is its unity. A third ancillary 
point is that corporeal substances are at the heart of his metaphysical system. In the end I 
suggest a starting point for a "new system" of interpreting Leibniz's metaphysics. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower, 
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand 
And Eternity in an hour.1 
 
—William Blake 
 
 
THE BACKGROUND: UNITY, HARMONY, AND DIPLOMACY 
 
In the eventide of the seventeenth century, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the last "universal 
genius," is working out the structure of his metaphysics. A councilor to princes and adviser of 
kings, he is a statesman and courtier, found at the epicenter of the great diplomatic struggles of his 
day; during his lifetime there are nine major wars and a theologically fractured Church divided 
against itself. In his "spare time" he tirelessly pursues mathematics, physics, philosophy, and he 
contributes to virtually every subject matter.2 As a philosopher, he is one of the most brilliant of 
                                                
          This thesis follows the style and format outlined in The Chicago Manuel of Style, 15th edition. 
 
          1. "Auguries of Innocence," 1794, in 100 Great Poets of the English Language, ed. by Dana Gioia with 
Dan Stone (New York: Pearson Longmann, 2005), 130. 
          2. Matthew Stewart sums this up well: "When an idea flared in his kinetic mind, he would grab it like 
a torch and run until the next bright light caught his eye, and then he would add that one to the bundle in 
his arms, too, dropping a few others in his haste and so leaving behind a trail of smoldering visions. In the 
120 volumes' worth of material in the Leibniz archives, there are without doubt hundreds of sparkling 
inventions that have yet to be catalogued, let alone realized. He wrote about everything, to everybody, all the 
time"; The Courtier and the Heretic, Matthew Stewart (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 91. 
Leroy Loemker writes that "few achievements of the day can be named in which he did not have a hand," 
e.g., the discovery of phosphorus and European porcelain, a self-regulating mechanism for the steam 
engine, history and jurisprudence, to name a few. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Paper and Letters, ed. 
and trans. by Leroy E. Loemker (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2nd edition, 2nd printing, 1989), 8. 
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the century, and his interests coincide with his diplomatic goals. He aspires to improve the well-
being and happiness of humanity, and to this end he encourages the formation of an Ordo 
Theophilorum, an Order of God-lovers, whose members are to be charged with improving the well-
being of all people.3 He attacks the problem of reconciliation, which he sees in Europe and 
Christianity, through seeking out a common metaphysical theory that will unite the parts divided 
over theological differences. His goals depend, at least partially, upon this metaphysical ground he 
articulates and defends. In this ground he hammers in the notions of unity and harmony as being 
the most essential of all to understanding the structure of reality. 
Perhaps it is when Leibniz walks with Queen Sophia, in her garden at the summer palace 
of Herrenhausen, that he is most struck by the balance each individual part can have when 
belonging to a whole. The garden as a whole is designed so that there are many smaller gardens, 
each built according to its own principle of organization, and then hidden beyond the curve of the 
path, folded from sight until you come upon it. Fish ponds and fountains—which Leibniz is 
consulted with for matters of design—are carefully planned in the enormous palace grounds, 
concealed by hedges and walkways, or conspicuously placed at crossroads. Harmony was, in such a 
place, seemingly palpable.4 
And perhaps it is in his duty as a diplomat for the House of Hanover that he comes to 
appreciate how inseparably connected all the European states are, and how important harmony is 
to any unification—perhaps too, he sees Louis XIV, the Sun King of France, as an aggressive, un-
tethered prototype for his doctrine of unification through domination—though what Leibniz has in 
mind is something more benevolent, tempered by his ontological and theological commitments. 
                                                
          3. Ibid., 9. 
          4. See Leroy Loemker's introduction, Philosophical Paper and Letters, 13, for detail on the garden and 
historical context. 
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All things are inescapably connected, on all levels of existence. Even in its deepest recesses, reality 
moves towards unification, which is always achieved through the domination of that which 
perceives more clearly, more perfectly, over that which is confused. But nature is designed by a 
perfect God, so such striving is one and the same with striving after perfection, which is expressed 
as universal harmony. Justice, for both God and humanity, is the charity of the wise, and 
ontological domination works within the confines of wisdom and charity.5 Each element of nature 
is manifestly related with every other, organized according to a divine vision of harmony. 
For Leibniz, these twin themes of unity and harmony are the most essential characteristics 
of reality. Whatever does not exhibit them does not, in any true sense, exist. And what has such 
qualities is, by definition, and by its very nature, a substance. His ontology is an ontology of 
substance, of that which is truly one and truly in universal harmony. The axiom he holds, yea with 
both hands, is that "nothing is truly one being if it is not truly one being."6 Unity is central to 
understanding being. I know of no other pronouncement on his part (save perhaps when he talks 
of geometry), where he so forthrightly tells us his axiom. This forms the cornerstone of his 
metaphysics. And I endeavor to show that unity and harmony both converge in the one-ness of a 
corporeal substance. The harmony of a corporeal substance is its true unity. 
Of course, there is disagreement about what sorts of things exist in the metaphysical 
expanse he illuminates. There are substances, surely, but what exactly qualifies as a substance? 
                                                
          5. "I have put in my preface to the Codex Iuris Gentium, that justice is nothing else than the charity of 
the wise, that is to say goodness toward others which is conformed to wisdom." "Meditation on the 
Common Concept of Justice," 1702-3, Leibniz: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2nd printing, 1988), 54. "That justice is nothing but the charity of the wise. That charity is universal 
goodwill, the execution of which the wise person performs in conformity with the measure of reason, in 
order to obtain the greatest good." From a letter written to Arnauld, 23 March 1690, G.W. Leibniz: 
Philosophical Texts, ed. and trans. by Richard Francks and R.S. Woolhouse (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 137. 
          6. Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, Texts, 124. 
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Does anything else besides substance exist? It is at times difficult to ferret out the content of his 
ontology, and most puzzling of all is the status of bodies and corporeal substances. We find there 
are three basic interpretations of Leibniz on this issue. There is, first, the accepted ontological 
reading, in which bodies are phenomena and corporeal substances simply do not exist. A second 
view treats Leibniz's "later years" and "middle years" more or less as separate partitions of his 
intellectual development. In his later, perhaps more mature philosophical reflections, Leibniz is 
seen as a full blown phenomenalist, while in the middle years he still believes in real bodies and 
substantial forms. So this second view holds that his ontological commitments experience a drift 
towards phenomenalism, until finally he falls under its spell. A third position, which is considered 
heterodoxical, is that Leibniz never accepts the phenomenalist picture at all. There is a real world 
out there (by which I mean that matter and bodies are not phenomenal) and preceding 
interpretations of Leibniz as a phenomenalist are egregious.  
It is this last view with which I am sympathetic, and in what follows I will defend a version 
of it. The picture Leibniz gives us is more complex than the accepted view would have it, for he 
seems to claim that bodies are not only phenomena, but are also aggregates of corporeal 
substances.7 It may be difficult to see how bodies can be both, and what ontological status 
corporeal substances can have in such a picture. Yet I believe that this is his considered view, 
which he holds to the end. My chief aim is to show that Leibniz does hold these seemingly 
disparate positions, and that his ontology is richer than he has been given credit for. Corporeal 
substances are real substances, and they require monads but are not reducible to them. This 
realization must, I believe, force us to rethink the structure of his metaphysics, and in the final 
                                                
          7. Cf. "Primary Truths," (1689), Philosophical Essays: G. W. Leibniz, ed. and trans. by Roger Ariew and 
Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1989), 34; ibid., 105 (notes on Fardella, March 
1690); ibid., 203 (Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 May 1716). 
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analysis I will suggest an approach that seems a fruitful avenue of exploration. The result, I hope, 
will offer a more integrated approach to Leibniz, and perhaps in the end will provide a more 
penetrating understanding of his thought. 
 
THREE ONTOLOGICAL READINGS OF LEIBNIZ 
 
Nonetheless, the accepted reading has the high ground. There is perhaps good reason for 
this; when writing to De Volder, Leibniz insists, "we must say that there is nothing in things but 
simple substance, and in them, perception and appetite." 8 On the standard interpretation, then, 
there is nothing real in the world except simple substances. There are no physical or material 
things. Only mind-like beings exist, and nothing more (save for the appearances inside them). He 
is, we might say, an idealist, meaning that mind-like entities are the foundations of (or perhaps the 
only) things that exist. 
But the standard account goes further than idealism. It also embraces the related view of 
phenomenalism, by which I generally mean that nothing but these mind-like entities exist.9 More 
accurately, the view I am calling phenomenalism is a theory of the ontological status of bodies and 
matter. Matter is not "stuff out there" composing bodies. Reality is at its bones composed only of 
these simple substances, and there is nothing external to minds. The appearances of reality are 
merely that: appearances. And there are only minds, and in them, appearances—so there can be no 
corporeal bodies. If there are no corporeal bodies, neither are there corporeal substances; for there 
                                                
          8. Cited in Daniel Garber, "Leibniz and Idealism," Leibniz: Nature and Freedom, ed. by Donald 
Rutherford and J.A. Cover (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 95. 
          9. For a fuller treatment of the distinction between idealism and phenomenalism, and how this helps 
illuminate Leibnizian scholarship, see Nicholas Jolley, "Leibniz and Phenomenalism," Studia Leibnitiana 18 
(1986): 38-51. 
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can be no union between a body and soul (that is, a corporeal substance) if there are no bodies to 
be unified with souls. There is only the non-material. So in answer to the question "what exists?" 
the standard account would have Leibniz answer that there are only these simple substances, pure 
mind-like beings, which he comes to refer to as monads. The claim that "only simple substances 
exist" amounts to saying Leibniz is both an idealist and phenomenalist. We can call this standard 
reading the Phenomenalist account. 
Robert Adams, perhaps the most trenchant Phenomenalist, insists that Leibniz's comment 
to De Volder reveals an axiomatic principle of his metaphysics. For Adams, Leibniz is 
unmistakably a phenomenalist: bodies are intentional objects.10 They may be understood as 
belonging to a story—a scientific story—and are "nothing but thoughts."11 Bodies are "not complex 
enough to express something that expresses the whole universe as a monad does."12 Bodies are 
finite representations—appearances, expressions—of monads that contain within them an infinity 
of relations. In other words, bodies are the appearances of monads—an infinitude of them—based 
upon the limited perceptions of finite minds. Phenomena are modifications of substance—
modifications that have as their representational content other monads.13 So, for example, matter 
and extension are the properties of phenomena, which is to say, properties of the perception of the 
appearance of other monads.14 A corporeal substance would then be nothing more than an aggregate 
of monads corresponding to these appearances. It would not be real in any strong ontological 
                                                
          10. Robert Adams, "Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz," Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 8 (1983): 218. 
          11. Ibid. 
          12. Ibid. 
          13. Ibid., 220. 
          14. "Bodies—organic or living bodies in particular—are appearances of monads." Ibid., 226. 
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sense, since its unity does not result from perceptions, but is the harmony of them.15 The union of 
body and soul is the union of a "harmony of perceptions of monads"—the dominant monad being 
identical with the soul. The soul must therefore on this account be a substance.16 Corporeal 
substances are therefore at bottom only aggregates of substances; but aggregates cannot have real 
unity, so their unity is only in the mind. 
If one is already a committed Phenomenalist, then it is easy to see how Leibniz's comment 
to De Volder is a confirmation of Phenomenalism. It is worth noting, however, that while idealism 
and phenomenalism are compatible, the former does not entail the latter.17 There is perhaps little 
disagreement about whether Leibniz was an idealist—at the least he seems to embrace something 
like it later in life. But idealism on its own is not evidence of phenomenalism. The real force of 
this view, as I see it, is summed up in Adams's question: "How, according to Leibniz, are bodies 
constructed out of simple substances and their properties?"18 If we begin with mind-like beings, 
which have no causal interactions with each other, then it is hard to imagine (as Adams points out) 
that a real being can somehow be produced from the mix. For example, a bundle a wood arranged 
in a fire pit does not of its own volition catch fire. The catalyst, say a match or a lightning strike, 
must be added. Only then is there a fire (each individual piece of wood is on fire, but the collective 
result can perhaps be referred to as one fire). In the Leibnizian model, there is no apparent way (it 
                                                
          15. Ibid., 239. For Adams, "Leibniz's claim is that aggregates have their unity and, therefore, their 
being only in the mind and that this is true even of aggregates of real things." 
          16. See, for example, Robert Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 275. 
          17. Idealism, as I have defined it, is the view that the ultimate elements of reality are mind-like things. 
However, idealism so defined would only entail phenomenalism if (1) being mind-like entails being 
immaterial, and (2) that collections of such things cannot have material qualities. But it is not clear that (1) is 
true, since it does not seem that a mind-like thing is necessarily immaterial (at any rate, I do not think 
Leibniz makes this case because he equates souls with substantial forms and active force—thus more may be 
implied than only perceiving); and (2) borders on a compositional fallacy. 
          18. Adams, "Phenomenalism," 217. 
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is thought) to bring together the elements for a fire, since there is nothing outside, no match or 
lightning strike, to unite the bundle in one flaming mass. There is nothing external to mind-like 
substances, which poses a problem of explaining how they could come together as one substance. 
This is what Samuel Levey calls the "problem of construction."19 Since a being by construction almost 
seems automatically to have accidental unity—and for Leibniz, this would amount to having no real 
unity at all—there seems to be a real difficult question about the unity of corporeal substances. No 
aggregate or collection of things is itself a thing. As Adams states, "Leibniz's claim is that aggregates 
have their unity and, therefore, their being only in the mind and that this is true even of aggregates 
of real things."20 The unity of such things, then, is an appearance. 
Adams thus declares that aggregation is phenomenal; there are no (literal) heaps of 
monads—minds or souls take up no space and cannot heap. Reality is an infinity of these mind-like 
monads and their perceptions, all in full-step harmony, and being real simply means being a 
monad (according to Adams, this is the main criterion), or perceiving a grouping of them (which 
gives only the appearance of a thing). On the way in which such aggregations of substances result 
in bodies, Adams sums up his position: 
In order for there to be corporeal aggregates that are real by virtue of the reality of the 
substances aggregated in them, they must appear as material masses in this coherent system 
of phenomena and, therefore, they must satisfy the harmonious perceptions condition for 
reality.21 
 
                                                
          19. Samuel Levey, "Leibniz and Idealism," unpublished manuscript. 
          20. Adams, "Phenomenalism," 239. The passage from Leibniz he cites in support is, "I have believed 
therefore that I would be permitted to distinguish Beings of aggregation from substances, since those Beings 
have their unity in our mind, which relies on the relations or modes of genuine substances"; original source 
is The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, ed. and trans. by H. T. Mason (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1967), 121. 
          21. Ibid., 247. 
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A living body is thus a corporeal substance, which is the union of a dominant monad with an 
organic mass. The formation of such a substance follows the principle of pre-established harmony 
among all perception. This harmony is a pre-requisite for being real, or well-founded, and the 
phenomena that make up all bodies are systematically organized. Adams writes that "Phenomena 
are real, in a weak sense, if and only if they fit into a single scientifically adequate system."22 
Corporeal substance is thus both an aggregate of substances as well as a phenomenon (understood 
as a systematic organization of perceptions), existing as a single thing without parts, as an aspect of 
minds. The reality of which Adams speaks is heavily phenomenal. 
The standard view Adams defends has been challenged in recent literature, by a position I 
will call Restricted Phenomenalism. Since Daniel Garber's "Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: 
the Middle Years," scholars have sought to understand Leibniz as having a middle or later period 
of thought, and the attempt to understand his corpus of work systematically has been somewhat 
abandoned.23 It is true that Leibniz in fact denies having built a system.24 He describes to Placcius 
how "extremely distracted" he is, consumed by his duties as a historian for the House of 
Brunswick, and how he has so many thoughts in mathematics and philosophy (as well as literary 
observation) he does not want lost, that he's "often bewildered as to where to begin."25 Indeed, 
some of his best philosophical work is found in his correspondences, and not in any single 
definitive piece. He gives no overarching, self-contained system to posterity. On this account, he 
                                                
          22. Ibid. 
          23. "Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: the Middle Years," in K. Okruhlik and J. R.  Brown 
(eds.), The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), 27-130. 
          24. In a letter to Des Billettes, 1696, Leibniz writes, "My system, about which you express curiosity for 
some news, is not a complete body of philosophy, and I make no claim to give a reason for everything 
which others have sought to explain. We must proceed by stages to proceed with firm steps. I begin with 
principles, and I hope to be able to satisfy most of the doubts like those which have troubled Mr. Bernier." 
Paper and Letters, 13. 
          25. Letter to Placcius, 1695, Papers and Letters, 12. 
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perhaps has impressive sketches, with themes and explorations sometimes later revised if not 
abandoned.26 Garber holds that in the "middle years" Leibniz was a realist with regard to bodies 
and corporeal substances, but he later abandons this for the more "familiar" position of 
phenomenalism. Catherine Wilson says that in these later years, after 1703, his "new theory of 
immaterial atoms could not be grafted on to the old theory of corporeal substance."27 We thus 
find, in his middle or "late-middle" years, his attempts to reconcile the contrary doctrines of 
monads and corporeal substances. He actively resists the collapse of his system into a "pure 
phenomenalism."28 It is the pressure from De Bosses that finally causes him to knuckle under; Des 
Bosses, Wilson claims, forces Leibniz, "for the sake of logical coherence…to choose definitely 
between monads and corporeal substances."29 After flirting with the unfortunate, but 
understandable postulation of a vinculum substantiale "urged on him by de Bosses," Leibniz finally 
capitulates. When it came right down to it, "he did not hesitate" to choose monads over corporeal 
substances.30 "He did not care in the end about the vinculum because he did not care in the end 
about corporeal substances."31 Leibniz is compelled to accept phenomenalism. 
                                                
          26. While it may be questioned whether Leibniz has a fully developed system, it is above reproach 
that he is a systematic thinker. His desire was in part to bring peace to Europe, to end the wars sprung from 
theological rifts. There was a keen and certain purpose behind what he attempted, which was (in my 
estimation) to synthesize all that he considered good in other systems, to bring them together in one "open 
system." His systematic thinking was then influenced by the desire to accommodate other viewpoints. Of 
course, it is important to realize that Leibniz does talk as though he has a system, and he tells us what it is 
like: "If someone were to reduce Plato to a system, he would render a great service to mankind, and it would 
then be clear that my own views approach his somewhat" (Leibniz to Nicolas Remond, 11 February 1715, 
Papers and Letters, 659). In the following discussion, when I talk of Leibniz's "system" I will therefore have in 
mind that he did indeed aspire to a comprehensive system, even though it never was worked out fully in 
any one place. 
          27. Catherine Wilson, Leibniz's Metaphysics: A Historical and Comparative Study (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 191. 
          28. Ibid., 192. 
          29. Ibid. 
          30. Ibid. 
          31. Ibid., 193. 
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Return for the moment to the comment Leibniz makes to De Volder, quoted above: "we 
must say that there is nothing in things but simple substance, and in them, perception and 
appetite." For Adams, Garber and Wilson, this is inescapable evidence for the phenomenal Leibniz. 
Yet we may rightly ask what Leibniz means when he says "there is nothing in things," for it is not 
immediately obvious what he means by "things." Perhaps the case can be made that Leibniz here 
claims substances are in "things," in which case it would be strange to read "thing" as being a 
phenomenal object. Interestingly, in the same letter Leibniz writes: "For there can be nothing real 
in nature except simple substances and the aggregates which result from them."32 This raises 
questions on whether aggregates might have some standing apart from simple substances, which in 
turn might hinge on what he means by "result from." Ontological commitments of a realist 
persuasion are certainly not ruled out of the picture (and by realist I mean the heterodoxical view 
that matter and bodies are not simply phenomenal). Leibniz goes so far as to mention "actual 
bodies" in this letter, which creates even more potential distance from the bare phenomenalist 
interpretation. The point to be taken is that a passage, while seeming to be phenomenalist, will be 
balanced, often in the same letter or essay, by remarks that seem strikingly realist. I believe this 
casts doubt on the axiomatic status of there being nothing but simple substances, insofar as this is 
meant to imply a full-throated reductionism. 
This brings us to a third view of Leibniz's ontological commitments. A growing group of 
heterodox thinkers claim that a real material world is a foundational component of his position. 
Pauline Phemister is one of its staunchest defenders. According to Phemister, an extended body to 
the Phenomenalist is merely "the result of a confused perception of what is in reality a logical 
                                                
          32. Leibniz to De Volder, 19 January 1706, Papers and Letters, 539. 
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grouping of unextended monads."33 Reality, composed of an infinity of simple, unextended 
substances, appears to us as extended bodies—but the problem (for the Phenomenalist) is that 
bodily extension is not even close to being a description of the universe, and cannot be regarded as 
"even partially true."34 The perception of bodies would then result from confusion. She argues that 
bodies are "more than the aggregation of unextended and indivisible monads: that he [Leibniz] 
regarded them also as aggregates of corporeal substances."35 Thus Phemister argues that Leibniz 
held bodies to be results of monads, as well as being aggregates of corporeal substances, and she 
denies the view that extended bodies are simply phenomenal objects. She writes, "All corporeal 
substances . . . have organic bodies composed of other corporeal substances whose bodies contain 
more corporeal substances, and so on to infinity."36 Corporeal substances, then, are the parts of 
bodies. 
 
HETERODOXY 
 
Of these three views, the heterodox seems to me the most correct. As I will try to show, 
there are some important ways in which the other two views fail to account for textual evidence, 
and ignore important arguments Leibniz provides. Even though he is often understood as a 
phenomenalist, too much evidence stands against this claim, calling for a more realist account. 
Contrary to the Phenomenalist, Leibniz does in fact claim corporeal substances exist; and these are 
what make phenomena real, even if this raises the "problem of construction." In the fourth chapter 
                                                
          33. Pauline Phemister, "Leibniz and the Elements of Compound Bodies," British Journal for the History 
of Philosophy 7/1 (1999): 60. 
          34. Ibid.  
          35. Phemister, "Compound Bodies," 57. 
          36. Ibid., 64. 
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I will focus on answering this challenge, investigating the conceptual resources Leibniz has to 
support the real or substantial unity of corporeal substances. 
Faced with the reality of corporeal substance, I believe a new interpretation of his system is 
needed, which both explains and allows for this sort of ontology. At the end of chapter IV I will 
offer an interpretation that can, perhaps, mark a direction to explore in Leibnizian scholarship. 
His system can be understood in terms of three levels, like a three-tiered city. The bottom, or first 
tier, is composed of simple substances, or monads. Each works autonomously, independently of all 
the other monads. From this activity results corporeal substances, which form the second tier of 
reality. So while the first tier is characterized by simples (which have absolutely no parts), the 
second is characterized by the union of body and soul. Body can be extended, and the relations of 
extended bodies result in the third tier, which is characterized by the union of phenomena in 
terms of space, time, extension and motion.  
Extension can also be explained metaphysically, as the order of coexistences. The order of 
coexistences grounds the appearances of the extended bodies of corporeal substances. How we 
perceive reality, then, is not mistaken or false, for our perception corresponds with ideal relations 
among real bodies.37 The order (i.e., the ideal relations) that is the extension of the body is neither 
phenomenal nor substantial, but is grounded in the modification of the soul's primary matter. The 
                                                
          37. It may be argued (on the account I give of Leibniz's view) that since an extended body is 
composed of other extended bodies, this network then reduces to merely ideal relations among monads. 
Bodies would then be redundant. I respond that the relations that make bodies real are different from the 
relations that make bodies extended. For Leibniz, I would argue, the former relations are real, since a body 
is made real through a substantial form. But extension is the relation among bodies (not corporeal 
substances), so we can understand this as the relation among substantial unities. Therefore, saying that 
extension is the ideal relation among real bodies does not reduce to merely ideal relations among monads 
(it would only reduce to this if bodies themselves are no more than aggregates of monads, which is 
something Leibniz does not seem to hold—bodies are, instead, aggregates of corporeal substances). 
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appearance of a body is thus at bottom both ideal and real, and this can be either the appearance 
of a corporeal substance or pure aggregation (depending on whether it has true unity). 
The unity of appearances, however is only itself appearance, unless it can be explained 
through one of the deeper levels of reality. And this third tier of reality, dealing with phenomena, 
is the physical world as we experience it. Here we find the appearances of space and time, as well as 
extension and motion (where these all have deeper ontological components and explanations). 
Like reality itself, bodies can be understood in three ways: they can be understood as aggregates of 
monads, as aggregates of corporeal substances, and as real or well-founded phenomena.38 This way 
of speaking about bodies resists the temptation to limit bodies simply to phenomena, and allows 
for an integration of the diverse elements of Leibniz's metaphysics.  
                                                
          38. See Phemister's article, "Compound Bodies," for an account of how bodies can be both monadic 
aggregates and aggregates of corporeal substances. 
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CHAPTER II 
ARGUMENTS ON THE REALITY OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE 
 
The focus of this chapter will be to establish the reality of corporeal substance. I contend 
that Leibniz's ontology is more full-bodied and flexible than the Phenomenalist's austere 
landscape portrays it. Since corporeal substances are often analyzed in terms of bodies, aggregates 
and phenomena, these will receive considerable attention. In the first section I examine the 
ontological status of bodies, and how they are usually evaluated in terms of being aggregates or 
phenomena. The second section takes up the issue of real phenomena, and I will argue that when 
we examine the issue we are not led to the Phenomenalist position. Rather, Leibniz gives reasons 
to resist such a move. In the third section, I provide textual evidence for the reality of corporeal 
substance. The fourth section is devoted to examining the claim that, later in life, Leibniz 
abandons the doctrine of corporeal substances. These considerations provide reason to reject 
both Phenomenalist and Restricted Phenomenalist accounts. Even though Leibniz is concerned 
with phenomena, and his system has a place for them, he is not after all a Phenomenalist. 
 
BODIES, AGGREGATES, AND PHENOMENA 
 
It is a standard view that for Leibniz bodies are aggregates of substances. The ontological 
status of an "aggregate," however, is a bit controversial. Equally important is answering the 
question of what bodies are aggregates of. The two competing candidates for the elements of 
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bodily aggregation are monads and corporeal substances. In a compellingly blunt passage, Leibniz 
writes: 
I showed that bodies are only aggregates that constitute a unity accidentally [per accidens], 
or by extrinsic denomination and, to that extent, are well-founded phenomena; that only 
monads (among which the best are souls, and among souls, the best are mind) are 
substances.1 
 
This of course should jolt any proponent of a realist account, for it seems a strong 
pronouncement of the view that monads alone are substances, and bodies, aggregates.2 Still, 
Leibniz does not say what they are aggregates of, though the context could be read as affirming 
that they are aggregates of monads. Adams points out that he is "commonly read" as holding this 
position.3 And he believes, for Leibniz, "aggregates as such cannot be more than phenomena even 
if they are aggregates of simple substances or monads."4 What, then, is the ontological status of the 
aggregate? The answer to this question will indeed determine the ontological standing of bodies. 
According to Adams's reading, there are only monads, or simple substances, and he uses this in 
his analysis of aggregate ontology. An aggregate is a collection of "things," and because of this, the 
problem of unity immediately surfaces, for aggregates, as such, can have no true unity; they are 
                                                
          1. Toward a Philosophy of What There Actually Is and Against the Revival of the Qualities of the Scholastics 
and Chimerical Intelligences, (1710-16?), in Essays, 319. 
          2. Leibniz here seems to plainly state that only monads are substances (and he defines "monad" in 
this context as a soul or mind). But what at first seems to end the debate can be seen in a number of ways. 
For example, in other passages which we will look at, he denies that souls are substances. At times he 
seems to refer to corporeal substances as monads, and at other times as simple substances. The best way to 
make sense of this wide range of seemingly contradictory opinions is to see that he does not in the above 
passage deny that other things besides souls are substances. Souls are "the best," but this does not preclude 
more "materialistic" substances from also existing, e.g., corporeal substance. He can also be seen as perhaps 
talking loosely about the nature of substance, and pointing to the ultimate irreducible foundations of 
composite substances. A full treatment of these issues, however, will be held off until later chapters. 
          3. Adams, Leibniz, 241. 
          4. Ibid., 242. 
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not "things" but collections of them—and in swift reductionist fashion, we can only find monads 
as the elements of collections. Since everything "is logically or metaphysically constructed" from 
monads, aggregates are (therefore) these logical constructs, and they "exist in the mind" as all such 
constructs must.5 All "aggregation" takes place through arranging the furniture of the mind. It is 
in this way that bodies are, fundamentally, phenomena. Indeed, Leibniz states: 
So it seems that in philosophical strictness the body does not deserve the name of 
substance, a view which seems to have been Plato's, who says that there are transient 
beings which never subsist longer than a moment. But this point needs a fuller discussion, 
and I have still other important reasons for refusing to bodies the title and name of 
substance in a metaphysical sense. For to say a word about this, a body is not a true unity; 
it is only an aggregate, which the Scholastics call a being per accidens, a collection like a 
herd. Its unity comes from our perception. It is a being of reason or rather, of imagination, 
a phenomenon.6 
 
This is an important passage, since as Loemker suggests, Leibniz is "reaffirming his 
phenomenalism" right at the time of his correspondence with Des Bosses.7 The Des Bosses 
correspondence is significant, and we will look more closely at it; but for now, we need only note 
two things: 1) Leibniz states that bodies are phenomena; and 2) a commitment to the unity of 
bodies being phenomenal is not ipso facto a commitment to Phenomenalism (e.g., he also talks of 
them as aggregates in this passage) . Nonetheless, the emerging puzzle is that bodies are seemingly 
both aggregates of substances as well as phenomena. How can this be? Adams reconciles the two 
theses by saying they have different ontological standing. Perhaps it is a matter of emphasis. 
Bodies as aggregates of substances are a "close ontological kin to sets," and have their being in the 
                                                
          5. Ibid., 246. 
          6. Conversation of Philarète and Ariste, Following a Conversation of Ariste and Theodore, Ca. 1711, in 
Papers and Letters, 623. 
          7. Ibid., 628 
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mind.8 But it is a mistake to think the members of a set have the same properties as the set itself. 
For example, the property of being multicolored belongs to the set of primary colors, yet not the 
members of the set.9 In similar fashion, a body is like a set, having properties different from that 
of the substances that constitute the set. The set itself, however, is never external to the mind—
though the members are all external, since these members are other mind-like substances. Bodies 
as aggregates of substances have a different, deeper ontological foothold. But these aggregates 
cannot themselves become substances. Leibniz writes that "no ordered principle [rien de reglé] will 
ever be found for making a genuine substance of many beings by aggregation."10 Adams takes this 
as an indication that there are no real corporeal substances; there are only monads and their 
perceptions. He writes: 
Leibniz's theory of bodies is reductionist, and in reductionist philosophy, being a logical 
or metaphysical construction out of ultimately real things is a different ontological status 
from that of the ultimately real things.11 
 
Bodies exist in the mind, and are "reduced" to simple substances as their ultimate elements, but in 
such a way that the phenomena have an elevated ontological status. These elements are real, while 
bodies are phenomena ("real phenomena," which we will examine shortly). Monads form bodies, 
and Adams argues that this aggregation of monads is "based on the way that the substances, or 
their bodies, are perceived."12 Perceiving is prior to aggregation, and is the reason for it, forming 
                                                
          8. Adams, Leibniz, 245. 
          9. I owe this example to a conversation had with John O'Neal. 
          10. Given marginally in The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspndence, ed. and trans. by H. T. Mason 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967), 101; quoted in Adams, Leibniz, 249. 
          11. Ibid., 245. 
          12. Ibid., 249. 
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the web of logical relations "uniting" monads to form bodies and corporeal substances. 
Supporting evidence for Adams's claim comes from a comment Leibniz makes to Des Bosses: 
And aggregates themselves are nothing but phenomena, since things other than the 
monads making them up are added by perception alone, by virtue of the fact that they are 
perceived at the same time.13 
 
For Adams this means that perception brings about aggregation, supplying the principle of unity 
to a body. This may strongly suggest a world of only monads and perceptions. But it is significant 
that a handful of lines above Adams's citation, Leibniz lays out what I consider the heart of his 
theory of corporeal substances: 
An aggregate, but not a composite substance, is resolved into parts. A composite substance 
only needs the coming together of parts, but is not essentially constituted of them, 
otherwise it would be an aggregate. It acts mechanically, since it contains primitive or 
essential forces and derivative or accidental forces. 
 It is the echo of monads, which, from its nature [ex sua constitutione], once posited, 
requires monads, but does not depend on them. The soul is also the echo of external 
things, but yet it is independent of external things. 
 Since neither monads nor partial, composite substances taken apart from the 
whole composite substance are the active essence [of a composite substance], the 
composite substance can be eliminated, leaving behind the monads, or other ingredients, 
and vice versa.14 
 
Here is the crux of Leibniz's doctrine of corporeal substances, occurring in the same letter in 
which he affirms that aggregates are nothing but phenomena. All previous talk of bodies being 
aggregates and phenomena does not slow Leibniz down in the least: he still insists there are 
corporeal substances (what he at times refers to as composite substances). These are no mere 
aggregates, and cannot be simply explained away as such. A corporeal substance has no parts, and 
therefore it can qualify as an unum per se, one in itself. They do not depend on monads, yet 
                                                
          13. Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 May 1716, Essays, 203. 
          14. Ibid. 
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require them. Discussion of bodies and aggregates would then seem to leave corporeal substances 
unaffected, since Leibniz distinguishes them from aggregates (and, therefore, from phenomena). 
Perhaps most interesting is that in the last sentence he says, "composite substance can be 
eliminated, leaving behind the monads, or other ingredients, and vice versa." Vice versa? Truly an 
unexpected phrase to find at the end of a sentence "reducing" corporeal substances to monads. 
What does Leibniz mean? He is not fully clear; but it seems that, in some "reductionist" manner, 
monads and corporeal substances are coeval (this issue will be expanded upon later). 
Nonetheless, Adams understands a corporeal substance as being "composed of a monad 
and the organic body of that monad . . . . The organic body is itself an aggregate, and hence a 
phenomenon."15 These bodies, which are phenomena, depend on the "spatial appearances of the 
bodies."16 That is, a body is in space, and space is ideal or in the mind of the perceiver as relations, 
hence a body (or its construction) is fully identified as a phenomenon. Accordingly, we could say 
that each monad has its own private epic movie playing, and each movie is harmonized with every 
other; and through these stories the monads appear to one another. These appearances in the 
stories are the bodies of monads.17 They are intentional objects belonging to the scientific story of 
nature.18 Adams maintains that a corporeal substance is something like an aggregate of monads 
corresponding to these appearances, and thus would not be real in any strong ontological sense. 
The soul would then be the dominant monad in the aggregate, and therefore, it would be a 
                                                
          15. Adams, Leibniz, 250. 
          16. Ibid. 
          17. Adams, "Phenomenalism," 226. 
          18. Ibid., 218. 
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substance.19 Corporeal substance would roughly be the principle of aggregation for a body, in the 
sense that it is a logical relationship underlying phenomena. Adams notes, however, that his 
account is not definitive and other interpretations are open.20 In the following sections I will take 
up Adams's challenge, and develop an alternative analysis. 
 
TRUE BODIES AND REAL PHENOMENA 
 
Our focus now must shift to what Leibniz says about phenomena, since this is so much at 
the center of the Phenomenalist's account. Is the body, then, the appearance of a monad and fully 
in the mind (in the same way that a set is), even though its elements are external? Remarkably, 
Leibniz never seems to say that bodies are the appearances of monads, even though he says they 
are phenomena.21 However, not all phenomena are equal. Leibniz is careful to distinguish 
between what is real and what is imaginary, and this would seem to support the Phenomenalist—
so, we cannot broad-brush and say that bodies are "merely" phenomena. They are real phenomena 
(or at least some of them are) and thus have an elevated metaphysical status, over and above what 
                                                
          19. See Adams, Leibniz, 275 
          20. Adams notes: "Those who seek a less phenomenalistic reading of Leibniz might wish to find a 
construction of corporeal aggregates that is independent of such phenomenal properties of bodies. One 
approach would be to suppose that monads are aggregates together on the basis of similarities among their 
perceptions. In a broad enough sense of 'similarity', this is surely correct, but the question is, Which 
similarities are relevant?" Ibid. The basis of my answer to Adams's challenge is to show that the harmony 
which results in corporeal substance is sufficient for its unity. It is the harmony or unity among passive and 
active forces that result in form and matter, body and soul. Passivity and activity are not phenomenal 
properties, and thus their coming together can result in true unity. Of course, all monads are in varying 
degrees of harmony with each other, but this does not lead to monism, since the harmony of a body and 
soul, when it results from a single point of view, is qualitatively different from, say, the harmonious 
interaction of bodies.  
          21. Adams makes note of this. Leibniz, 230. 
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is imaginary. How, then, do we perceive the difference between real and imaginary things, if all 
we have are appearances? Leibniz treats the issue at length in the essay, appropriately titled, 
Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena. Perhaps the very fact that Leibniz thought it 
important to distinguish the real from the imaginary would be evidence of his phenomenalism; 
but as will become evident, a close examination does not bear out this conclusion. 
In Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena, Leibniz says a being can be known to be 
real either through conceiving (which is of concepts) or perceiving (which involves phenomena). 
Real phenomena conform to the natures of other phenomena, are vivid, coherent, supported by 
sensory experience, agree with the experiences of other people, and are predictable.22 These 
criteria are meant to help us judge "which phenomena should be seen as real" (emphasis mine).23 A 
real phenomenon, then, is grounded in the actual harmony of appearances, as they are ordered 
according to natural law (which springs from the agreement among monads). 
One striking fact about this essay is that Leibniz nowhere claims that "bodies" and "real 
phenomena" merely mean the same thing. The possibility that bodies are more than phenomena is 
left open. Consider that Leibniz begins the essay by discussing how we know if a thing actually 
exists. He then says, "Just as being is revealed through a distinct concept….so existence is revealed 
through a distinct perception."24 Phenomena "can be accepted without question," and need no 
demonstration; yet later he emphasizes that bodies cannot be demonstrated to exist. That is: 
bodies cannot be demonstrated and phenomena need no demonstration. Is this a discrepancy for 
                                                
          22. Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena, (1690?), in Papers and Letters, 363-364. 
          23. Ibid., 364. 
          24. Ibid., 363. 
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the Phenomenalist, pointing to a distinction between phenomena and bodies? Perhaps not; 
perhaps Leibniz means that phenomena are basic, in that we start with appearances from which 
we can distinguish what is real from what is imaginary. Illuminating this matter, he writes: 
We must admit it to be true that the criteria for real phenomena thus far offered, even 
when taken together, are not demonstrative, even though they have the greatest 
probability; or, to speak popularly, that they provide a moral certainty but do not establish 
a metaphysical certainty, so that to affirm the contrary would involve a contradiction. 
Thus by no argument can it be demonstrated absolutely that bodies exist, nor is there 
anything to prevent certain well-ordered dreams from being the objects of our mind, 
which we judge to be true and which, because of their accord with each other, are 
equivalent to truth so far as practice is concerned.25  
 
Leibniz thus calls attention to a relationship between the criteria for real phenomena and 
establishing the existence of bodies. Criteria, however, cannot be used for demonstrating that a 
phenomenon is real. He then says that the existence of bodies "thus" cannot be demonstrated 
through any argument. We can deny, without contradiction, that a phenomenon is real or a body 
exists. So based on the comparison he draws between real phenomena and the existence of 
bodies, we may justifiably read Leibniz as equating the two. However, he conspicuously stops 
short of affirming this. Furthermore, since he talks of well-ordered dreams as being "equivalent to 
truth," he seems to draw a distinction between that which is merely well-ordered, and bodies. On 
the Phenomenalist account this is peculiar, given that organized and harmonious appearances 
simply are bodies. As I will try to show, it is significant that he says well-ordered dreams are 
"equivalent to truth." Writing of the limitation of perception for establishing "metaphysical 
certainty," Leibniz writes: 
                                                
          25. Ibid., 364. 
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Nor is the argument which is popularly offered, that this makes God a deceiver, of great 
importance. At least no one will fail to see how far it is from a demonstration having 
metaphysical certainty, for we are deceived not by God but by our own judgment, 
asserting something without accurate proof. And though a great probability may be 
involved, nevertheless God, in offering us this probability, is not therefore a deceiver. For 
what if our nature happened to be incapable of real phenomena? Then indeed God ought 
not so much to be blamed as to be thanked, for, since these phenomena could not be real, 
God would, by causing them at least to be in agreement, be providing us with something 
equally as valuable in all the practice of life as would be real phenomena.26 
 
Appearances do not provide metaphysical certainty, since it is at least conceivable that we 
are "incapable of real phenomena." This is a curious phrase, since it is not immediately obvious 
what he means by "incapable." He can, perhaps, mean that we are not able to produce them. Or 
perhaps he means that our nature cannot have appearances, in that only material objects can have 
appearances, and if our nature is immaterial, then appearances of any sort are impossible.27 In 
either case, however, God is no deceiver when he creates us to think some perceptions are real. It 
might not even be possible for God to create beings "capable" of real phenomena. Given these 
sorts of options for what Leibniz means by "incapable," it is easy to read one's own theory into the 
meaning. We must for now resist this temptation. 
Still, Leibniz can be construed as giving the following chain of reasoning, which is friendly 
to the Phenomenalist: 1) we are, in fact, capable of real phenomena. 2) Yet all we have is moral 
certainty (not the certainty of demonstration) in regard to real phenomena. 3) Without 
demonstration it is conceivable that this is all we are capable of. 4) But even if this is all we are 
                                                
          26. Ibid. 
          27. Another possible interpretation might be to take "capable" of real phenomena as being able to 
investigate in such a way as to verify the reality, or not, of a given perception. But I do not think this 
interpretation is plausible, given that Leibniz says in this passage that "these phenomena could not be real." 
Our verification of reality is therefore not the issue—the issue is whether there are real phenomena or not. 
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capable of, God has not deceived us and we are still justified in trusting our perceptions. 
Construing Leibniz in this manner requires that if we are incapable of real phenomena, then the 
perception of a real phenomenon is different—perhaps radically different—from what we now 
perceive as real. Either there is a fundamental ontological gap between what we actually perceive 
and a real phenomenon, or there is simply no such thing as a real phenomenon.  
If the phenomena we do perceive are not real, Leibniz suggests that what God has given us 
is equally as valuable by "causing them at least to be in agreement." This raises an important issue. 
Adams thinks that this means Leibniz is "constantly aware of the epistemological vulnerability of 
the full ontology" he holds, namely his phenomenalism.28 And this is purportedly why Leibniz 
worries about distinguishing real from imaginary appearances. Adams suggests that Leibniz uses 
"'real' in a stronger and weaker sense in expressing different aspects of a fairly constant" system, 
and this would coincide with a "weak sense of 'true'."29 
The first problem with this account is that the issue Leibniz puts on the table is whether 
there are real phenomena at all. He does not, per Adams's suggestion, differentiate between 
strong and weak senses of 'real' and 'true'. Leibniz says up front that such phenomena would not 
be real. They would not then be true, but God would guarantee that they would be just as good. 
To read Leibniz as using 'real' in a strong and weak sense requires a prior commitment to a 
Phenomenalist interpretation. It is interesting that the possibility Leibniz admits of (that there 
might be no real phenomena) is similar to Phemister's critique of the Phenomenalist. She points 
out that they burden Leibniz with a difficult, if not unreasonable, thesis: 
                                                
          28. Adams, Leibniz, 259. 
          29. Ibid. 
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The spatially extended body, by this account, is at best a phenomenal object; the result of 
a confused perception of what is in reality a logical grouping of unextended monads. It is 
difficult, on this reading, to regard the extension of the body as sufficiently real to allow a 
description of the universe in terms of extended physical bodies to be even partially true.30 
 
According to Phemister, the account given by the Phenomenalist has Leibniz explain bodies in a 
way that is hard to see as "even partially true." What we perceive is not only confused, but false, if 
these perceptions are in reality only clumps of logical relations. But Leibniz says here that if there 
are no real phenomena we are nonetheless not deceived. Perhaps, then, what Leibniz says in this 
essay can be seen as a response to Phemister's objection, that is (contrary to Phemister) what 
appears is as close to the truth as can be attained. 
But of course, Leibniz does not say that what appears is not true. He suggests that it is 
possible that there are no real phenomena, that is, that it is possible we are "incapable of real 
phenomena." A great deal then seems to rest on what is meant by "incapable of real phenomena." 
If we are incapable, Leibniz says, what God has given us is sufficient and equally valuable. What he 
has given us, in lieu of "real phenomena," is agreement, that is, a harmony of phenomena. 
Agreement is for the phenomenalist the basis for a phenomenon being real rather than 
imaginary. How can phenomena that are "at least . . . in agreement" be anything but real 
phenomena? The Phenomenalist can respond by pointing out that if what we perceive are real 
phenomena, then "agreement" is the key to distinguishing them. But if what we perceive is not 
real, then agreement is not the key—there is no key, since there are no real phenomena. If the 
distinguishing characteristics Leibniz gives of real phenomena (vividness, harmony, etc.) do not 
constitute real phenomena, then what do they pick out? Look at the live oak outside your 
                                                
          30. Phemister, "Compound Bodies," 60. 
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window. Is it a real phenomenon? It is only if you are "capable of" real phenomena. The question, 
then, is not the harmony or agreement of our appearances (since there can be agreement in 
phenomena even if none of them are real), or how well they conform to experiences and internal 
coherence—the issue Leibniz explores is whether any phenomena are real in the first place. And this, 
I believe, points to something beyond or "outside" of phenomena, to what constitutes their reality. 
Or to put it another way: the agreements of phenomena do not make them real, since phenomena 
could be said to agree whether they are real or not (since God would give us agreement even if we 
are incapable of such a reality). 
And that is the nagging difficulty for the Phenomenalist. For if there are no real 
phenomena, then there are no bodies, since bodies simply are real phenomena. But why would 
Leibniz even doubt whether there are bodies if they simply are phenomena that are in agreement and 
harmony? It seems rather easy to say that those phenomena which are "in agreement" are bodies, 
and to end it there. Yet Leibniz forces the issue, acknowledging that it is conceivable for no 
phenomena to be real. In other words, on the phenomenalist reading, when Leibniz says there is 
a possibility we are "incapable of real phenomena," he is actually saying it is possible that we are 
"incapable of perceiving real bodies." But what would this mean? Would it mean that there are no 
bodies, or that we are incapable of perceiving them? The latter seems unintelligible on the 
phenomenalist reading. For assume that there are bodies but we cannot perceive any of them. This 
would imply that what appears are in fact not bodies at all. Furthermore, if these unperceivable 
bodies exist they would need to be composed of some phenomena—perhaps, for example, petites 
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perceptions.31 This, however, is of no help. Petites perceptions are not imperceptible, but insensible. 
They are, for Leibniz, the confused appearances in the bodies that we actually perceive (so they 
presuppose that bodies are already perceived). It is possible to perceive them (i.e., perceive them 
more clearly) simply by whipping out a microscope. However, this possibility contradicts the 
assumption that bodies cannot be perceived. So the phenomenalist appears committed to the 
position that it is metaphysically possible that there are no bodies. 
As Phemister points out, for the Phenomenalist, bodies are in reality (or at bottom) logical 
groupings of substances. But then, does Leibniz really mean to ask, what if there are no logical 
groupings? These logical relations would of course be among minds and perceiving substances. It is 
noteworthy, however, that Leibniz's "epistemic doubt" in this context does not involve doubting 
the existence of other minds, since he writes, "now we must examine those things which do not 
appear but which nevertheless can be inferred from appearances."32 He then promptly establishes 
the existence of other minds; so his doubt is not of the solipsistic variety. For the Phenomenalist, 
this doubt is really about the metaphysical certainty of the logical relations of these minds. But the 
Phenomenalist's interpretation makes little sense, since Leibniz argues for a logical relation 
between appearances and other minds—it is the nature of appearances which confirms the 
existence of minds. The reading that seems to make the most sense of Leibniz's question is that he 
thinks of bodies as more than a logical network among minds. Bodies have a reality to them that 
is neither phenomenal nor simply logical in nature. So I think Leibniz really is suggesting that 
even if there are no real phenomena, we still can fall back on the Phenomenalist thesis, which God 
                                                
          31. Preface to the New Essays (1703-1705), in Essays, 295-297. 
          32. Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena, in Papers and Letters, 365. 
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will ensure to be as accurate as possible. Phemister's point is therefore well taken. If the 
Phenomenalist's account holds, it is in the end not entirely true—it would be as close to a true 
picture of reality as we can get. Phenomenalism is not Leibniz's preferred theory of reality, but a 
bullet he is willing to bite, only if he must. If there are real phenomena (and Leibniz insists that 
this is a moral certainty) then we need not bite the Phenomenalist bullet. But if there are no real 
phenomena, what we have are akin to well-ordered dreams, which are equivalent to truth. 
At the end of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena, Leibniz, in complete Leibnizian 
fashion, takes off in another direction: 
Concerning bodies I can demonstrate that not merely light, heat, color, and similar 
qualities are apparent but also motion, figure, and extension. And that, if anything is real, 
it is solely the force of acting and suffering, and hence that the substance of a body 
consists in this (as if in matter and form). Those bodies, however, which have no 
substantial form, are merely phenomena or at least only aggregates of the true ones. 
Substances have metaphysical matter or passive power insofar as they express 
something confusedly; active, insofar as they express it distinctly.33 
 
As before, Leibniz does not say phenomena are simply bodies, but that certain bodily qualities, 
e.g., extension, motion, heat, are properly phenomena (or "apparent"). What is real (he says "if 
anything is real" in bodies—he qualifies his claim about the reality of bodies because of the 
previous doubt he voices) is the force of acting and suffering, by which he refers to the active and 
passive aspects of a substance. These are, he says, the "substance" of a body as the matter and 
form. But then, he talks of bodies that "are merely phenomena" because they "have no substantial 
form" (what he elsewhere calls soul or entelechy or active force). They are aggregates of "the true 
ones." An aggregate of the true what—substances? Bodies? Phenomena? Leibniz, as far as I can tell, 
                                                
          33. Papers and Letters, 607. 
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never talks of phenomena as aggregates.34 He must therefore mean either substances or bodies. 
The true ones are aggregates of real elements, brought together with a substantial form. An 
aggregate of true ones not united by a substantial form is a phenomenon. Whatever Leibniz has in 
mind as the elements of these aggregates, the true ones are no mere aggregates, or else they would 
be phenomena—and as aggregates they would be bodies without substantial form. So, the meaning 
of the passage seems to point to a true one being a body with a substantial form.  
Of course, the context might support a reading of "true ones" as substances. In either 
case—whether substances or bodies are members of these aggregates—Leibniz is looking beyond 
phenomena to the foundations of aggregation. There is also an important question about the 
status of bodies when they have substantial forms. On the phenomenalist reading, bodies are 
phenomena because they are aggregates. Leibniz here says that bodies without substantial form are 
aggregates. This implies something easily overlooked: bodies, not aggregates, have substantial forms. 
If a body has a substantial form it is henceforth not simply an aggregate: it is a body. And if they 
are not aggregates, according to the phenomenalist reading, they are not phenomena, since the 
argument for why all bodies are phenomena is that they are all aggregates. We therefore have the 
provisional conclusion that in this essay, which is devoted to differentiating between real and 
imaginary phenomena, Leibniz implies that some bodies are not only phenomena. And a body 
with a substantial form is, by its very nature, a corporeal substance. In support of my reading of 
this passage, we can turn to the correspondence Leibniz has with Arnauld: 
                                                
          34. In other words, while Leibniz seems to hold that aggregates are phenomena, I do not think he 
holds the obverse, that phenomena are aggregates. 
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If the body is a substance, and not a mere phenomenon, like the rainbow, or a being 
unified by accident or by aggregation, like a heap of stones, it cannot consist in extension, 
and we have to conceive of it as having something like a substantial form, which in some 
way corresponds to the soul. Almost despite myself I have finally been convinced of this, 
after having earlier been very far from it.35 
 
As we have seen elsewhere, Leibniz is very clear about there being bodies that are 
aggregates. But notice here that he does not begin by saying: If body is substance. Instead, he says, if 
the body is a substance, and not a phenomenon, then it has a substantial form. He does not seem 
to sweep all bodies into this formulation, but he calls attention to individuated bodies. Perhaps, it 
might be suggested, Leibniz compares "mere phenomena" with "real phenomena," and therefore, 
the Phenomenalist may say that he illuminates only the difference between real and imaginary 
phenomena. But this is implausible, for three reasons. (1) I have found no evidence that when 
Leibniz says "mere phenomena" he means "imaginary phenomena." In this context, "mere 
phenomena" could refer to the category of phenomena itself, or to something ephemeral 
(consider his illustrating example: the rainbow). However, (2) in this context he implies a body 
with substantial form is neither a mere phenomenon nor an aggregate, which makes it seem as 
though he lists the possible phenomenalistic explanations, in order to say, "but I am not talking 
about these things." So even if we were to interpret "mere" as "imaginary" phenomena, it would 
seem that "real phenomena" would naturally coincide with bodies of aggregation. He could be 
seen as talking of something that is neither a mere nor real phenomenon. And as already 
mentioned, (3) nowhere in Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena does Leibniz fully identify 
bodies with real phenomena. It is beyond doubt that Leibniz argues for real phenomena, but 
                                                
          35. Leibniz to Arnauld, 4/14 July 1686, Texts, 113. 
 32 
  
  
when he carefully reviews the issue, he does not say real phenomena are (organic or living, and 
not merely aggregate) bodies. Real phenomena, he says, are vivid and predictable, cohering with 
all other observations. As Adams points out, real phenomena are what belong to a scientific 
account of nature. Leibniz here talks empirically, giving criteria for what will count as part of this 
story. But he distinguishes substantial bodies from this mechanistic picture, since these are 
neither aggregates nor mere (i.e., only) phenomena. Some bodies, then, are not defined only 
extensionally, but substantially, having a substantial form. That is, all bodies are perhaps 
extensional, but not all are substantial. What he points to, I believe, is the reality of corporeal 
substances (which can be understood both extensionally and substantially). 
 
THE REALITY OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCES 
 
Based on this evidence, it has not been established that bodies are, in fact, more than real 
phenomena. But what has been noted is enough to establish at least a foothold for the position 
that bodies are anchored in something deeper and external to phenomena. Indeed, Leibniz states 
that organization is not enough to account for individuality. 
Organization or configuration alone, without an enduring principle of life which I call 
'monad', would not suffice to make something remain numerically the same, i.e., the same 
individual.36 
 
It takes more than the agreement (i.e., organization) of phenomena, to account for 
individuality. An enduring principle of life is needed, and he identifies this as relating to 
                                                
          36. New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. and trans. by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd printing 1997), 232. 
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substance (which is beyond phenomena). He uses the word "monad" to describe this principle 
(this may seem a variance from his normal usage, but I believe this merely indicates his true 
position, as will be discussed later). Nonetheless, the Phenomenalist has other arguments. There 
are various and sundry passages in which Leibniz writes more explicitly of the relation of bodies 
and phenomena. For example, 
As matter itself is nothing but a phenomenon, but well founded, resulting from monads, 
it is the same with inertia, which is a property of this phenomenon.37  
 
If matter is "nothing but a phenomenon," it may well be asked how bodies can be more than 
phenomena. Elsewhere, Leibniz writes: 
Extension and motion, as well as bodies themselves (insofar as only motion and extension 
are placed in bodies) are not substances, but true phenomena, like rainbows and 
parhelia.38 
 
Matter itself, he says, is nothing but a well-founded phenomenon. But taken as a conceptual 
object, matter is a well-founded phenomenon.39  Bodies, he tells us, are true phenomena, and not 
substances, insofar as motion and extension are in them. What Leibniz does not say here is that 
bodies are, in an unqualified sense, true phenomena, since he couches the claim in reference to 
motion and extension. Consider again the phrasing: insofar as only motion and extension are placed in 
bodies, they are not substances. He means, I take it, that bodies considered only in virtue of motion 
and extension are not substance, but true phenomena. What else might bodies have? Entelechies. 
Souls. Substantial forms. To further make the point: 
                                                
          37. Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, vol. III, ed. by C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: 
Weidmansche Buchhandlung, 1875-1890), 636; cited in Adams, "Phenomenalism," 222. 
          38. Primary Truths 1689, in Essays, 34. 
          39. It is because he indicates "matter itself," which I believe is equivalent to what he elsewhere refers 
to as "mass," or that which is formless. 
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[Size, extension and motion] are qualities or predicates which partake of the phenomenal, 
as do colors and sounds; although they contain more that is distinctly knowable, they too 
cannot sustain a final analysis, and therefore since extended mass considered without 
entelechies consists only of these qualities, it is not a corporeal substance, but a pure 
phenomenon, just as the rainbow. . . . I accept, of course, that we can give the name 'one' 
to a collection of inanimate bodies even if no substantial form connects them, just as I can 
say 'there is a rainbow', 'there is a flock'; but that is a phenomenal unity or a unity of 
thought, which is not enough to constitute what is real in phenomena. But if we take for 
the matter of corporeal substances not a formless mass, but secondary matter, which is the 
multitude of substances the mass of which is that of the body as a whole, we can say that 
those substances are parts of that matter, in the way that those which make up our bodies 
form the parts of it. For just as our body is the matter and our souls are the form of our 
substance, so it is with other corporeal substances.40 
 
There are four things of relevance. First, this seems a strong endorsement of the reality of 
corporeal substance. Second, he talks of matter, and secondary matter, which will become 
important later in the discussion. And third, mass, without an entelechy, is a pure phenomenon 
(this suggests a distinction between 'matter' and 'mass' that will become important later). Fourth, 
he says: "a phenomenal unity or a unity of thought . . . is not enough to constitute what is real in 
phenomena" (my emphasis added). It is important to realize that what is real, for Leibniz, is 
substance. This suggests that substance is the objective content of phenomena. He writes to 
Arnauld: 
You object, sir, that it could be of the essence of body to have no true unity; but then it 
would be of the essence of body to be a phenomenon, bereft of all reality, like a well-
ordered dream. For phenomena themselves—such as the rainbow, or a heap of stones—
would be completely imaginary if they were not composed of beings which have true 
unity.41 
 
Leibniz does not deny that some bodies may be phenomena, but he denies that a 
phenomenon provides a body with an essence. Bodies, accordingly, can have or are composed 
                                                
          40. Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687, Texts, 131-32. 
          41. Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, Texts, 124. 
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from true unity. Without true unities phenomena would be completely imaginary, like a well-
ordered dream.42 Perhaps we can say that substance, or true unity, is the objective content of 
phenomena; but it does not follow that Leibniz's understanding of bodies is only phenomenalist. 
What follows is that we perceive bodies in terms of phenomena and objective content, since he 
identifies bodies in some way with true unity (thereby distinguishing them from phenomenal 
unity). Since Leibniz does hold there to be true unities, he is here affirming that phenomena are 
ontologically grounded. "Phenomena," then, can either mean what appears (but the content of 
phenomena is the true unity of other beings), or the perceived unity of what is in fact real.43 In 
other words, phenomena can be regarded as the perceived unity of "things" or as the perceived 
unity among other phenomena. Understood in these terms, there is no inconsistency between them. 
At times what is perceived will be a true unity, and at times what is perceived will have 
phenomenal unity. Things are not phenomenal, but real, and even within a phenomenal unity 
                                                
          42. Note how this ties in with the discussion of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena. 
          43. Some interesting issues are raised, in these passages, on Leibniz's us of terminology. For example, 
he says a rainbow is a "pure phenomenon" as well as a "true phenomenon." Are these synonymous with a 
"real phenomenon?" An extensive textual comparison would need to be made to determine the answer. 
But consider that Leibniz also talks of "true unit" and "real unity," which seem the same, and are both 
distinguished from "phenomenal unity." If a real phenomenon is the same as a true one (and it is 
reasonable to equate "pure" and "true," since the rainbow is both a pure and a true phenomenon), then 
whether a phenomenon is real or not will (perhaps) be connected to Leibniz's theory of truth. And we 
could try to understand the nature of phenomena in terms of truth conditions (which will perhaps 
indicate a correspondence to that which is external to phenomena). If, however, real and true phenomena 
are different, then I believe a real phenomenon must be identified as the appearance of the body of a 
corporeal substance. Unraveling this complex issue is, unfortunately, too great a task for this present 
project. 
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there will be real unities, that is, real beings (it is the unity among real beings that is 
phenomenal).44 Consider this oft-quoted passage (which we will return to): 
It would seem, moreover, that what makes the essence of a being by aggregation is only 
the way of being of the things that make it up; for example, what makes the essence of an 
army is just the way of being of the men who make it up. That way of being therefore 
presupposes a substance, whose essence is not itself the way of being of a substance. So 
every machine also presupposes some substance in their parts of which it is made, and 
there is no multitude without true unities. To cut the point short, I hold as an axiom the 
following proposition which is a statement of identity which varies only in the placing of 
the emphasis: nothing is truly one being if it is not truly one being. It has always been held 
that one and being are reciprocal things. It is one thing to be a being, quite another to be a 
number of beings; but the plural presupposes the singular, and where there is no being, 
still less is there a number of beings.45 
 
Leibniz holds that a phenomenon of unity is not true unity but a mode ("the way of being") of 
things. All modes presuppose substance. The essence of a substance is not itself a mode or way of 
being. The parts of a machine presuppose substance. True unity is what is real, the objective 
content of any phenomenon. Yet it does not necessarily follow from this that Leibniz's 
understanding of bodies is only phenomenal. One reason why the appearances of bodies involve 
phenomena is that they contain an infinity of substances. They are aggregates of an uncountable 
number of things and relations, and the perceptions of finite monads do not express infinite reality. 
Leibniz writes: "Every mind is like a world apart, sufficient to itself, independent of every other 
created thing, involves the infinite, and expresses the universe."46 Each monad may contain 
infinity, but without distinctly perceiving it. For in perceiving a single body, if it is clearly 
                                                
          44. "I do not say that there is nothing substantial or nothing but what is apparent in things which 
have no true unity, because I allow them always as much reality or substantiality as there is true unity in 
what enters into their composition." Ibid., 124. 
          45. Ibid. 
          46. A New System, in Texts, 234. 
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perceived, the entire universe would follow in all of infinite clarity. This is not possible for 
monads of limited perception. Hence, what is distinctly perceived is only partial, finite, and what 
is most distinctly perceived is what is most real in nature, namely substance, unity. 
The perception of the one must in some way be prior to the perception of the many (i.e., 
the infinite), since we do not clearly perceive the infinite. We perceive unities which imply the 
infinite.47 And bodies, as infinite collections of corporeal substances, appear in terms of qualities 
(e.g., colors and definite shape) that yield more complex—in fact, infinitely more complex—
explanations. Real unity, however, is not merely appearance or muddled perception, since it is in 
the corporeal substance. 
Of course, there are passages in which Leibniz seems to affirm that the unity among 
monads is only in the relations among their perceptions. For example, Adams cites the following: 
The agglomeration of these organized corporeal substances which constitutes our body is 
not united with our Soul except by that relation which follows from the order of the 
phenomena that are natural to each substance separately.48 
 
At first blush it may seem that Leibniz states the union of body and soul is only 
phenomenal. If we look closely at this statement, at least two things are apparent: first, bodies are 
aggregates of organized corporeal substances (and not monads); and second, the union he talks of 
here is between body (which is an aggregate of corporeal substances) and soul. There is no 
mention of union among monads or simple substances. There is no relation of body and soul 
except through the relation following the order of phenomena natural to all substances in the 
                                                
          47. Leibniz writes that "we can say in general that perception is the expression of a multitude in a 
unity" (Draft letters from Leibniz to Bayle, December 1702, Texts, 256). 
          48. Die philosophischen Schriften, vol IV, 573; cf. Adams, "Phenomenalism," 248. 
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corporeal substance. Is the unity therefore a phenomenon? The answer is not clear, since the 
relation following an order of phenomena is not obviously a phenomenon. It seems clear, 
however, that Leibniz is not simply reducing the union of body and soul to relations among 
monads. And he does not deny the union of soul and body by referring to an order of 
phenomena. However, on the basis of this passage Adams argues: 
It may be doubted, however, whether on Leibniz's showing the dominant monad gives to 
the composite that it forms with the organic body a unity fundamentally different in kind 
from the unity of an aggregate. As Leibniz himself said, monadic domination and the 
unity that springs from it consists at bottom only in certain relations among the 
perceptions of monads . . . Aggregates, too, are united (accidentally, Leibniz says) by 
relations among the perceptions of monads. So at bottom it would seem that the unity of 
an aggregate and the unity of a corporeal substance are of the same kind.49 
 
And so, for Adams, we here have reason to believe that the unity of a corporeal substance 
is really the same sort of phenomenal or logical unity we find in an aggregate. But Adams's 
reading of this passage requires that talk of body and soul is reducible to talk of monads relating 
to one another (and relating only through phenomena). The soul is a monad (and therefore a 
substance), and the corporeal substances of the body are simply aggregates of lesser monads. But 
this requires us to read "soul" as being a substance, and "body" as an aggregate of monads. Leibniz 
here seems to resist this reduction (or at least not give us reason to so reduce). We can 
alternatively read Leibniz as denying that a body and soul directly relate; that is, to talk of the 
union following only the relation of an order of phenomena can be seen as the rejection of 
extrinsic relations between body and soul. There are no direct external relations between them, 
since these sorts of relations are only phenomenal. In other words, the union is not found in 
                                                
          49. Ibid. 
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either body or soul. A body and soul do not "come together," but for their union they depend on 
a deeper level. 
However, the challenge for interpreting this passage seems to come down to the phrase 
"the phenomena that are natural to each substance separately." To which substances does Leibniz 
refer? Does he mean monads, or corporeal substances? His intent is unclear. If by "each substance" 
Leibniz means monads, then this passage may be in favor of the Phenomenalist. But if Leibniz 
refers to corporeal substances, then there is no full reduction of body and soul implied, and the 
issue of how the union follows the order of phenomena is left open to a more realist reading.50 
According to the Phenomenalist, soul and body are merely (or only) the aggregation of 
simple substances, one of them being dominant. However, if soul is not a substance, then 
corporeal substance cannot be an aggregate of substances (and the above passage cannot be 
explained in these terms). And this is exactly what we find in the Fardella memo, where Leibniz 
seems to affirms that souls are not substances: 
I do not say that the body is composed of souls, nor that body is constituted by an 
aggregate of souls, but that it is constituted by an aggregate of substances. Moreover, the 
soul, properly and accurately speaking, is not a substance, but a substantial form, or the 
primitive form existing in substances. . . . Further, although the aggregate of these 
substances constitute body, they do not constitute it as parts, just as points are not parts of 
the line, since a part is always of the same sort as the whole. However, the organic bodies 
of substances included in any mass of matter are parts of that mass.51 
 
                                                
          50. The issues raised by the passage Adams cites are quite complex, and I cannot go any deeper into 
it at this junction. However, I suggest that the unity relation following the order of phenomena is not itself 
a phenomenon. The order is pre-established, and somehow this expresses—the Phenomenalist might insist 
the order determines—the nature of the way in which substances interact with one another. Or to put it 
another way, the union of a body and soul is always and only metaphysical; it is never physical or 
phenomenal. 
          51. Notes on Fardella, March 1690, Essays, 105. 
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In this text he says that a body is not an aggregate of souls, but an aggregate of substances. 
Substances in a body are compared to the points in a line; the soul, however, is not a substance, 
but a substantial form in substance. It is the form of a collection of substances, which is the 
organic body or material mass. These substances (which he compares to points) are not parts of a 
body. The parts of a body are other bodies (since parts must be "of the same sort as the whole"). 
Phemister argues that this undercuts the Phenomenalist.52 If a soul is not a substance—as 
Leibniz seems to here indicate—then it cannot be a monad. Corporeal substance, accordingly, 
cannot be an aggregate of monads. But I think the Phenomenalist can respond by saying Leibniz 
has not developed his monadology yet—that is, his doctrine of simple, perceiving windowless 
substances has not fully emerged. And when he later illuminates his monadology it replaces this 
earlier stab in the dark. The Phenomenalist is, I believe, correct, in that Leibniz does come to see 
souls as substances (and he equates them with monads). But he also seems to dither on this. For 
example, he sometimes says monads are souls with primitive active force, and sometimes he 
ignores this definition. Sometimes a soul is a substance, and in other places he denies this. 
Unpacking why I think Leibniz seems to do this will have to wait until chapters III and IV. 
Nonetheless, while I agree with some of the Phenomenalist's position, I do not find it ultimately 
compelling, since it requires a "replacement" of the earlier view with the later one. Yet to my 
knowledge, Leibniz talks of corporeal substances to the end, never seeming to recant these earlier 
arguments and statements.  As quoted above, he writes to Arnauld in 1687: 
                                                
          52. Phemister, "Compound Bodies," 65-66. I am here simplifying matters, since this is only a 
preliminary point in a longer argument that she gives. 
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You object, sir, that it could be of the essence of body to have no true unity; but then it 
would be of the essence of body to be a phenomenon, bereft of all reality, like a well-
ordered dream. For phenomena themselves—such as the rainbow, or a heap of stones—
would be completely imaginary if they were not composed of beings which have true 
unity.53 
 
And in correspondence with Des Bosses, roughly thirty years later, Leibniz states something that 
looks as if it were lifted from his correspondence with Arnauld: 
If bodies were mere phenomena, they would nevertheless exist as phenomena, like the 
rainbow. You say that bodies can be something other than phenomena, even if they aren't 
substances. I believe that unless there are corporeal substances, bodies are transformed into 
phenomena (emphasis mine). 54 
 
And again with Des Bosses: 
 
You ask, finally, how my composite substance differs from an entelechy. I say that it differs 
from it only as a whole does from its parts, that is, the first entelechy of a composite is a 
constitutive part of the composite substance, namely its primitive active force. But it 
differs from a monad, since it makes phenomena real . . . briefly, my entire view here is 
derived from these two positions, that there is composite substance, endowing the 
phenomena with reality (emphases mine), and that substance cannot naturally arise or 
perish.55 
 
I think this indicates his general commitments remain unchanged (even if he has picked up 
additional convictions), and he is not committed to a phenomenalist system. He remains 
concerned with "endowing the phenomena with reality," which involves the existence of bodies 
composed of corporeal substance. Leibniz claims explicitly that there are composites (i.e., 
corporeal substances, and these, not the monad, endow phenomena with reality). 
Whether souls are substances or monads is not the true issue. For the argument against 
phenomenalism, I think it is enough to show that Leibniz does not hold corporeal substances to 
                                                
          53. Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, Texts, 124. 
          54. Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 May 1716, Essays, 203. 
          55. Ibid., 205. 
 42 
  
  
be aggregates. Since if corporeal substances are not aggregates, then they are not aggregates of 
anything—monads included. And in fact, as we noted earlier, Leibniz writes: 
An aggregate, but not a composite substance, is resolved into parts. A composite substance 
only needs the coming together of parts, but is not essentially constituted of them, 
otherwise it would be an aggregate.56 
 
A corporeal substance (what he refers to here as a composite) is not an aggregate. What is it, if not 
an aggregate? If something is real, but it is neither an aggregate nor a phenomenon, then it can 
only be a substance. Corporeal substance is thus truly substance (and not substance in name 
alone) since it is real, but neither aggregate nor phenomenon. A body, however, when considered 
apart from an entelechy, is both a real phenomenon and an aggregate of substances. 
So what position does corporeal substance play in Leibniz's metaphysics? The real 
phenomenon is made real by corporeal substance (by an aggregate of them). And the reality of a 
corporeal substance is not phenomenal, because it endows phenomena with reality. Furthermore, 
corporeal substance is not reducible to an aggregate of monads, because corporeal substances are 
not aggregates. I believe that these considerations support the realist position. What needs to be 
examined next is the claim that Leibniz abandons this view in his later years, in favor of a stark 
and simple phenomenalist ontology. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
          56. Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 May 1716, Essays, 203. 
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THE LATER YEARS 
 
Catherine Wilson urges that Leibniz drops corporeal substances in his later years, since he 
is forced into a corner by Des Bosses. He chooses monads and never looks back. She readily 
admits, however, that "it is nevertheless impossible to suppose that Leibniz held to a pure 
phenomenalism when he was not under severe pressure."57 He is caught in a quandary because he 
simply does not have the conceptual resources to maintain all he wants to maintain. So he 
jettisons what he least cares for—corporeal substances. Wilson identifies the "nexus of conditions" 
culminating in this problem: 
Leibniz could not reconcile the following three claims: (a) animals are real beings; (b) 
animals have extended, multiple bodies; (c) real beings cannot be extended and multiple. 
The theory of corporeal substances could take care of (a) and (b) but not (c); the theory of 
"metaphysical points" [monads] could take care of (b) and (c) but not (a).58 
 
Leibniz vainly tries to unite these separate threads in a single metaphysical weave, until the hard-
nosed Jesuit, Des Bosses, shows him he does not have the tools. His 'ontic schizophrenia' is 
evident in the Monadology itself, Wilson suggests, "between the descriptions of monads as 
unextended, simple, placeless elements and the descriptions of the world as a garden or a fish 
pond containing creatures without limit."59 His theory of corporeal substances is inconsistent with 
his theory of monads as "metaphysical points." An animal cannot both be a real, extended being 
                                                
          57. Wilson, Leibniz's Metaphysics, 194. 
          58. Ibid. 
          59. Ibid. 
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and "an appearance founded upon monads."60 And so, as cited by Wilson, Leibniz is compelled to 
tell Des Bosses:  
Therefore I should prefer to say that there are no substances over and above monads, but 
only appearances, but that these are not illusionary, like a dream . . . but that they are true 
phenomena, that is, in the sense that a rainbow or a parhelion is an appearance, and, in 
fact, in the sense that colors are appearances.61 
 
We may immediately wonder what Leibniz means by "I should prefer." Prefer to what? To 
the dilemma Wilson says he is in? To a certain hypothesis he puts forth? After all, it is here that 
he considers the vinculum substantiale, and the context can be taken to read that he merely rejects 
this particular hypothesis. The phrase "I should prefer" is by no means a signpost for absolute 
phenomenalism. Wilson has, by this point in her analysis, relegated the issue of the vinculum 
substantiale to something "urged" on him by Des Bosses.62 She argues that Des Bosses insists a 
monad is (for Leibniz) associated with a body, which is located in space and time. This 
association, however, reduces to perceptual relations, so organic bodies become redundant. For 
there to be organic bodies would require that there be something like a substantial bond or 
vinculum substantiale.63 
But as Adams indicates, Des Bosses at times resists accepting the vinculum, forcing Leibniz 
to come to its defense.64 The Jesuit seems to prefer Leibniz's "accidental or modal bonds," over the 
vinculum substantiale.65 Leibniz is in fact the first to mention the substantial bond, beating Des 
Bosses to the punch (if in fact it is Des Bosses' intent to urge it on him). Contrary to Wilson's 
                                                
          60. Ibid. 
          61. Letter to Des Bosses, August 19, 1715, Papers and Letters, 614. 
          62. Wilson, Leibniz's Metaphysics, 191. 
          63. Ibid., 192 
          64. Adams, "Phenomenalism," 252. 
          65. Ibid. 
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recommendation, then, it seems Leibniz could "prefer" a pure doctrine of monads to the doctrine 
of the vinculum substantiale, if he were judging the veracity of the vinculum hypothesis (and not the 
veracity of corporeal substance in general). 
Like Wilson, I believe the reason Leibniz introduces the vinculum substantiale is to attempt 
to answer a dangling question. However, I disagree with her characterization of his doubt, which 
she says is to reconcile the irreconcilable doctrines of monads and corporeal substances. On her 
account, Leibniz seems to vacillate, caught in a dilemma, unable to choose a side (until, of course, 
Des Bosses marches on the scene). But perhaps he is not caught mid-dither. Perhaps Leibniz's 
worry is directed elsewhere. Why would he entertain the notion of the vinculum substantiale? The 
intent is clear: to account for unity in composite substances (and a composite substance is not an 
aggregate of monads, but a body and soul).  
In the letter to Des Bosses that Wilson cites, Leibniz discusses two possible meanings of 
"substantial," and questions whether there can be something that is neither a modification, nor a 
source of modification. He finds none of this really able to account for the substantiality (i.e., the 
unity) of corporeal substances, which leads him to make the comments Wilson cites. Leibniz thus 
writes: 
I do not see how we can maintain the substance of a composite being, unless we want to 
regard substance as the result of accidents. In that case, however, I do not see how you 
explain participation. Therefore I should prefer to say there are no substances over and 
above monads. [italics mine]66 
 
The substance of a composite being cannot be maintained when "substantial" is neither a 
modification nor a source of modification (as he questions a few lines above these comments). 
                                                
          66. Letter to Des Bosses, August 19, 1715, Papers and Letters, 614. 
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But Leibniz's concern, nonetheless, is explaining the unity of a "composite being," that is, a 
corporeal substance. This is no isolated anxiety. He also expresses this in a letter to Tournemine, 
where he talks of the Cartesian explanation of the agreement of body and soul. His doubt, then, 
is whether he has done a better job than the Cartesians: 
My intent was to explain naturally what they [the Cartesians] explain by perpetual 
miracles, and I tried to account only for the phenomena, that is, for the relation that is 
perceived between soul and body. 
But since the metaphysical union one adds is not a phenomenon, and since no 
one has ever given an intelligible notion of it, I did not take it upon myself to seek reason 
for it. 
However, I do not deny that there is something having this nature. Its nature 
would be something almost like that of a presence, whose notion has also not yet been 
explained when applied to incorporeal things, and which is distinguished from the 
relations of harmony that accompany it, which are also phenomena capable of marking the 
location of incorporeal things. 
After having conceived of a union and a presence in material things, we judge that 
there is something I know not what analogous in immaterial things. But to the extent that 
we cannot conceive those notions further than this, we have only obscure notions of 
them.67 
 
 Leibniz is clearly aware of the difficulty in explaining the union of a corporeal substance. 
He qualifies his attempt as not being metaphysically comprehensive (though it is a metaphysical 
union). Although he does not doubt the reality of this union (which implies that he holds 
corporeal substances exist); and its nature in the phenomenon is "almost like that of a presence." 
There is presence in phenomena, which is more than the harmony of relations, and can only be a 
metaphysical union. 
So there is some doubt in the account Wilson provides. The fact that he mentions to Des 
Bosses that he would choose a doctrine of pure monads over the vinculum substantiale does not 
                                                
          67. Letter to Tournemine, 1708, "Remark of the Author of the System of Pre-established Harmony 
on a Passage from the Mémoires de Trévoux of March 1704," in Essays, 197. 
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imply a rejection of corporeal substances—at most it implies that he is dissatisfied with his account 
of the unity of a corporeal substance. Yet the general picture Wilson sketches of Leibniz's move to 
phenomenalism is also, remarkably, given by Leibniz himself. In a letter to Remond, he writes: 
When I looked for the ultimate reasons for mechanism, and even for the laws of motion, 
I was greatly surprised to see that they could not be found in mathematics, but that I 
should have to return to metaphysics. This led me back to entelechies, and from the 
material to the formal, and at last brought me to understand, after many corrections and 
forward steps in my thinking, that monads or simple substances are the only true 
substances and that material things are only phenomena, though well founded and well 
connected.68 
 
On first examination this looks like the end of the story: Leibniz confesses phenomenalism. He 
writes that "monads or simple substances are the only true substances." It should be noted that 
this is written very close to when he corresponds with Des Bosses. Why, then, does he float the 
idea of the vinculum substantiale to Des Bosses, if he is already entrenched in an "only simples are 
substances" ontology? After all, the purpose of the vinculum is to unify corporeal beings. It is 
Leibniz who urges the notion, and not Des Bosses. But this fragment written to Remond 
ostensibly flattens the very hope of extant corporeal beings, and with it, the intelligibility of even 
suggesting the vinculum substantiale. One potential reconciliation of this dilemma is that Leibniz 
introduces the vinculum as a diplomatic gesture towards a friend who holds different beliefs. In 
other words, he humors Des Bosses.69 This is of course difficult to accept if what we said earlier 
holds, namely, that Des Bosses shows some resistance to the notion. And if the above passage is 
taken as a statement of full-blown idealism—that only simples are substances—we run into an 
                                                
          68. Letter to Nicolas Remond, 1714-15, Papers and Letters, 655. 
          69. Adams notes that this is perhaps the majority view, and he gives a battery of reasons for why it 
cannot be maintained. Adams, "Phenomenalism," 250-254. 
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inconsistency, since in this very correspondence he also writes: "A true substance (such as an 
animal) is composed of an immaterial soul and an organic body, and it is the composite of these 
two that is called unum per se."70 As Glenn Hartz notes, unum per se, one in itself, strikes at the very 
core of Leibniz's metaphysic of substance.71 There can be no doubt that Leibniz here affirms that a 
unity of soul and organic body is substance. If we are to avoid attributing an inconsistency to 
Leibniz, we must say that something has gone wrong with the interpretation. Hence, when he 
says, "simple substances are the only true substances," he means, as I see it, that simple substances 
are the absolute or fundamental level, from which composite substances derive. The notion of 
there being two substances, one more fundamental than the other, is certainly not foreign to 
Leibniz. He opens The Principles of Nature and of Grace Based on Reason with the following 
pronouncement: 
Substance is a being capable of action. It is simple or compound. Simple substance is that 
which has no parts. Compound substance is a collection of simple substances, or monads. 
Monas is a Greek word signifying unity or that which is one. Compounds, or bodies, are 
pluralities, and simple substances—lives, souls, and spirits—are unities. There must of 
necessity be a necessity of simple substances everywhere, for without simple substances 
there would be no compounds. As a result, the whole of nature is full of life.72 
 
It would seem Leibniz holds there are both simple and compound substances. Indeed, 
Leroy Loemker says that in this passage (in fact all through The Principles of Nature and Grace) 
Leibniz's "phenomenalism is not made explicit."73 I would contend that this is because he is not a 
phenomenalist. He states—and rather plainly, I might add—that there are compound substances, 
                                                
          70. Letter to Remond, 1715, Die philosophischen Schriften, III, 657; cited in Glenn Hartz, "Why 
Corporeal Substances Keep Popping Up in Leibniz's Later Philosophy," British Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, 6/2 (1998): 195. 
          71. Hartz, "Why Corporeal Substances Keep Popping Up," 195. 
          72. The Principles of Nature and of Grace Based on Reason, 1714, in Papers and Letters, 637. 
          73. Ibid., 641. 
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and this is the reason why we must affirm that there are simple substances. He does not argue from 
the reality of unities to pluralities, but as far as I have been able to tell, he always makes the 
opposite case, moving from pluralities to the reality of unities. And so, the argument for 
Restricted Phenomenalism that Wilson supports is difficult to maintain. Leibniz does not, in his 
later years, seem to cast off his ontological commitment to corporeal substance. And if he does 
not adopt phenomenalism in the "later years," then he is not generally to be thought of as a 
phenomenalist as a mature philosopher. 
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CHAPTER III 
A FINAL ARGUMENT 
 
There is one more argument I want to discuss, which will be effective against both the 
Phenomenalist and Restricted Phenomenalist. It has to do with the connection between simple 
substances, substantial forms, and corporeal substances, in terms of how, and when, Leibniz 
argues for them. I will provide reasons why the doctrine of simple substances does not stand 
alone, but leans upon the older and deeper commitment to corporeal substances. His case for 
simples, in other words, is a result of his acceptance of corporeal substances. 
The argument for Phenomenalism rests, in part, on the view that Leibniz comes to think 
corporeal substances are untenable. One important reason for this is that anything built from 
simple substances could not be anything more than an aggregate. Simples have no parts, only 
contain perceptions and appetites, and are the sole element of things. Therefore, corporeal 
substances cannot be substances at all, for they would essentially be aggregates, or phenomena. As 
Adams writes: 
Given his doctrine that "there is nothing in things except simple substances, and in them 
perception and appetite", there is no way for the unity of a corporeal substance to be 
anything over and above the system of relations among perceptions of simple substances. 
But aggregates, too, are united by relations among the perceptions of substances…So on 
this line of thought it might seem that the unity of a corporeal substance is of the same 
kind as the merely accidental unity of an aggregate.1 
 
Again, we see the centrality Adams places on the claim that there are only simple 
substances. The objection he notes, however, is quite weighty. If there are corporeal substances, 
                                                
          1. Adams, Leibniz, 293. 
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they must somehow arise from monads. But there can be no unities outside of monads. How, 
then, can there be corporeal substances? Leibniz must have seen this, and therefore must have 
rejected the doctrine of corporeal substances (so, at any rate, the Phenomenalist may argue). The 
doctrine of simple substances leaves no room for composite substances. 
There are two separate issues that need to be investigated. The first will be the subject of 
the next chapter, which is giving an account of unity in the corporeal substance. The second is 
that his doctrine of simple substances trumps the doctrine of corporeal substances, leaving 
Leibniz no choice but to discard the latter. So, for example, he writes at the beginning of the 
Monadology: 
And there must be simple substances, because there are composites; for the composite is 
nothing but a collection, or aggregatum, of simples. 
Now, in that which has no parts, neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is 
possible. And so monads are the true atoms of nature; in a word, the elements of things.2 
 
Well-known statement like this have traditionally been seen as evidence for the Phenomenalist 
position. There is a jag in this account, however, since Leibniz arrives at simples by first 
acknowledging composites. Also, he does not here say composite substance, but "composite," and 
this is immediately compared with an aggregate.3 In fact, he seems to accept the existence of 
composite substances, i.e., corporeal substances, before developing a doctrine of simples. Samuel 
Levey mentions that in the decade from 1679 to 1689 Leibniz scarcely mentions simple 
                                                
          2. Leibniz, Texts, 268. 
          3. Compare this passage with the following, from Principles of Nature and Grace: "Every simple 
substance, or individual monad, which forms the centre of a composite substance (an animal, for example) 
and the principle of unity, is surrounded by a mass made up of an infinity of other monads which 
constitute the body. . . . This body is organic" (Ibid., 259). When he talks of composites, he refers to 
aggregates; yet composite substance is compared with an animal, or that which has a body. 
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substances at all.4 It seems he begins turning to them roughly around 1690 (when his 
correspondence with Arnauld came to an end). Evidence of this turn is found in a memo made of 
a conversation he had with Michel Angelo Fardella:  
There are an infinity of simple substances or creatures in every particle of matter; and 
matter is composed from these, not as parts, but as from constituent principles, or 
immediate requisites, just as points are essential ingredients of the continuum yet not 
parts.5 
 
In the same collection of notes, Leibniz also writes: 
Unless there are certain indivisible substances, bodies would not be real, but would only 
be appearances or phenomena (like the rainbow), having eliminated every basis from 
which they can be composed.6 
 
After 1690 these sorts of passages become more and more common, as he appears to be working 
out his doctrine of simple substances—his 'monadology', which is so familiar in the later years of 
his life. But before this, in the previous decade, he says very little about simple substances. He 
argues for something a bit different: extant corporeal substance and substantial forms. 
Leibniz is generally recognized as having accepted substantial forms no later than 1679 
(much earlier than his monadological doctrine). As Robert Adams makes note, the date of 
Leibniz's "momentous decision" to resuscitate substantial forms was discovered by Robinet, when 
he made a comparison of two documents, one of them addressed to Duke Johann Friedrich, who 
died in late 1679 (the reasoning is that Leibniz would not likely have penned a letter to a dead 
                                                
          4. Levey, "Leibniz and Idealism." 
          5. See Gottfried Wilhem Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Berlin: Deutschen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1923-), VI, 4, 1473; cf. Levey, "Leibniz and Idealism." 
          6. Texts, 103. 
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duke). Adams therefore puts Leibniz's acceptance of substantial forms in the summer of 1679.7 
Richard Arthur, however, disagrees (he thinks Adams is trying to maintain that Leibniz flirted 
with phenomenalism before accepting substantial forms), and Arthur believes that Leibniz 
reintroduces substantial forms as early as the winter of 1678.8 In any case, it is clear that Leibniz 
has forms firmly embedded in his philosophy by the time he corresponds with Arnauld (which 
ranges from 1686 to 1690). I believe that it is his doctrine of substantial forms that brings him to 
a doctrine of simples. 
How does he come to a doctrine of substantial forms? The answer has to do with his 
reaction to Descartes. Cartesian dualism is (roughly) the view that there are two substances: mind, 
which is essentially a "thinking thing", and matter, which is essentially extended. This picture of 
reality focuses much of the debate in the seventeenth century; a debate which turns on the 
problem of how these two substances interact, if they do, and whether dualism is in fact 
intelligible. Mind and body are essentially different things, with a seemingly unbridgeable gap 
between them. This renders their interaction or integration difficult to fathom. It is this picture 
of reality with which Leibniz wrestles. He attacks Cartesians in a number of ways, but his general 
strategy seems to be threefold: (1) extension cannot be the essential attribute of a substance; (2) 
thinking is too narrow to account for the myriad substances with which nature overflows; and (3) 
dualism cannot adequately ground physics.9 Nature is not dualistic, but rather a plenum of 
                                                
          7. Robert Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 236. 
          8. The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686, trans., ed., and with 
an introduction by Richard T. W. Arthur (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 416. 
          9. This last point is only briefly touched on, since it would take us too far into the relation of 
motion with primary an derived forces, and how these relate to space and time, etc. 
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individual substances, all essentially acting and perceiving. Perceiving (and not thinking) is the 
common trait of substances: minds or rational souls that belong to the City of God; entelechies 
or animal souls, which are not reflective and not able to apprehend moral laws; and finally those 
lower forms that are active forces, expressing the universe (but not doing much more than that). 
He mentions to Arnauld: 
It is perhaps more surprising that I deny what nevertheless seems so clear—the action of 
one corporeal substance on another. But others have already denied it, and we should 
consider it more a play of the imagination than a distinct conception. If the body is a 
substance, and not a mere phenomenon, like the rainbow, or a being unified by accident 
or by aggregation, like a heap of stones, it cannot consist in extension, and we have to 
conceive of it as having something like what is called substantial form, which in some way 
corresponds to the soul. Almost despite myself I have finally been convinced of this, after 
having earlier been very far from it.10 
 
Leibniz's solution to the inadequacies of Cartesianism is in substantial forms. Substantial 
forms bring unity to bodies, that is, they make bodies complete beings. He "cannot conceive of 
any reality without a true unity."11 This is central to his project of bringing together body and 
soul, as well as giving an ample foundation for physics. Very simply, there can be no interaction 
or coming together of form and matter if they are essentially different substances. There must then 
be an essential similarity. Take, for example, what Leibniz considers to likely be the highest 
substantial form: mind. There must be a similarity between the mind and the body, or else there 
can be no interaction of any sort (without invoking the pineal gland, perhaps). Therefore, the 
body itself is composed of other "lesser mind-like" substances; and so on down into the deeps of 
reality, on and on into merely perceiving (i.e., merely expressing) things which underlie. Like the 
                                                
          10. 4/14 July 1686, Texts, 113. 
          11. Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, Texts, 124. 
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myth that the world actually rests on the back of a turtle—but here we find there are turtles all the 
way down. 
This is the answer he works out in response to Cartesianism; but he develops his case as a 
reductio of the Cartesian concept of bodily substance. Descartes writes in Principles of Philosophy 
that "every place is full of bodies."12 Reality is a plenum; there are no voids, just a fullness, with a 
churning motion of the parts occupying this full universe. Descartes writes that because of this 
motion: 
What happens is an infinite, or indefinite, division of the various particles of matter; and 
the resulting subdivisions are so numerous that however small we make a particle in our 
thought, we always understand that it is in fact divided into other still smaller particles.13 
 
Leibniz finds this reasoning sound, and he follows Descartes in holding that reality is actually 
divided into smaller and smaller parts. But then he critiques Descartes by denying that a body can 
truly be a substance. His debate with Arnauld is dominated by the question of what does, in fact, 
count as a substance. As previously cited, Leibniz writes to Arnauld: 
To cut the point short, I hold as axiom the following proposition which is a statement of 
identity which varies only in the placing of the emphasis: nothing is truly one being if it is 
not truly one being. It has always been held that one and being are reciprocal things. It is 
one thing to be a being, quite another to be a number of beings; but the plural 
presupposes the singular, and where there is no being, still less is there a number of 
beings. . .14 
 
Here is the bedrock understanding of being. Whatever is one being is substance. On this point, 
Leibniz is adamant. And so if bodies are no more than the parts that compose them, and these 
                                                
          12. Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, trans. by John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff and Dugald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985; reprint, 1999), 237. 
          13. Ibid., 239. 
          14. Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, Texts, 124. 
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parts are actually composed of parts, then there cannot be any bodies. In other words, if a thing 
that is built from the bottom up is infinitely divisible, it cannot ever be real, since it would only be 
a collection of collections—but for collections to have any ontological standing, they must be 
contain real things. So if there is anything real in bodies at all, there must be real things that are 
not collections. In short, there must be things that have true unity. On the Cartesian account, 
extended substance would not even be substance. For there to be aggregates, there must be true 
unities that can enter into aggregates. There must be things that cannot be divided, or there 
would be no end to it, and nothing at all would be real. Whatever brings unity to extended 
bodies, if there is such unity, would need to come from something other than what is extended. 
One common answer given in the seventeenth century was that there must be material 
atoms, 'corpuscles', and these are the end-points of all bodily analysis. They have a definite shape 
and hardness to them, and their hooked and jagged shapes (which they were hypothesized as 
having) enable them to enter into composites.15 Bodies are therefore built from these irreducible 
pebbles. Leibniz rejects material atoms, however, since if extension is the essential trait of matter, 
then there cannot be a definite shape to it. And if there is no definite shape, there can be no 
smallest material atom that can join with any other. He writes, "In fact, we can say there is no 
precise fixed shape of a body because of the actual subdivision of its parts."16 Not only will a body 
                                                
          15. Cf. "Instead of explaining the properties of bodies in terms of their substantial forms, the 
mechanist explains their properties in terms of the size, shape, and motion of the tiny corpuscles that 
make them up. And so, the heat of fire may be explained in terms of the speed with which the parts of its 
constituent corpuscles move or their pointy shapes, and the wetness of water may be explained in terms of 
the eel-shaped particles of which it is made, whose shape allows them to slide past one another, etc." 
(Daniel Garber and Jean Baptiste Rauzy, "Leibniz on Body, Matter and Extension," Supplement to the 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105/3 [May 2005], 26.) 
          16. Texts, 119. 
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not have a definite shape, but it is itself something divisible (since it has no shape), and therefore, 
cannot be a smallest particle (since it has parts).17 What would the sufficient reason be for the 
indivisibility of this physical, extended atom? He concludes that "atoms of matter are contrary to 
reason."18 Yet, there still must be some things with true unity, or there would be nothing at all. 
And so, the true unities cannot be essentially extended material (which is the definition of matter 
that Descartes gives). "True unity" is, for Leibniz, just another way of saying substance. It logically 
follows, he thinks, from Aristotle—it is not a that without being a unity, a one thing, otherwise it 
would be a collection of other things "accidentally" brought together.19 So there must be 
substances, i.e., true unities, and these cannot be essentially extended, as the Cartesians claim. He 
writes to Arnauld: 
You will never find a body of which we can say that it is truly a substance: it will always be 
an aggregation of many substances. Or rather, it will never be a real being, since the parts 
which make it up face just the same difficulty, and so we never arrive at real being, because 
beings by aggregation can have only as much reality as there is in their ingredients. From 
this it follows that the substance of a body—if they have them—must be indivisible, and it 
doesn't matter whether we call that a soul or a form . . . Extension is an attribute which 
could never make up a complete being; and we could never get from it any action or 
change.20 
 
For a body to be a real being, there must be something indivisible. Otherwise, there is 
only a being by aggregation, which can never be more than what is in the aggregate—so if a body is 
a real being, there must be something more to it than aggregation. There must be something 
                                                
          17. Another problem is that if "material atoms" all have the same shape, and they are all the same on 
the inside, then there is nothing to distinguish one from another. 
          18. New System, Texts, 149. 
          19. Cf. Metaphysics Z 1028b1-35 and 1029a1-30, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation, vol. 2, ed. by Jonathan Barnes (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1624-5.  
          20. Leibniz to Arnauld, 28 November/8 December 1686, Texts, 116. 
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indivisible. Does "indivisible" entail "simple"? The answer is not clear.21 If it does, then Leibniz 
does not seem to have been aware of the connection in his correspondence with Arnauld. The 
indivisible substances are identified as substantial forms, and they are to account for the unity we 
find in real bodies—without them bodies would only be aggregates. He tells Arnauld, 30 April 
1687: 
If the view I have—that substance requires a true unity—were based only on a definition 
which I had made up contrary to standard usage, it would be only a 'dispute about a 
word'. . . But quite apart from the fact that ordinary philosophers have taken the word in 
more or less the same way, distinguishing between unum per se and unum per accidens, 
substantial forms and accidental forms, imperfect and perfect mixtures, natural and 
artificial things, I take things at a higher level, and, leaving aside language, I believe that 
where there are only beings by aggregation, there will not in fact be any real beings. Any 
being by aggregation presupposes beings endowed with true unity, because it derives its 
reality only from that of the things which make it up. It will therefore have no reality at all 
if every being of which it is composed is itself a being by aggregation, for whose reality we 
have to find some further basis, which in the same way, if we have to go on searching for 
it, we will never find. I agree, sir, that 'in the whole of corporeal nature there are only 
machines' (often animated ones), but I do not agree that there could be 'only aggregates of 
substances' . . . if there are aggregations of substances, then necessarily there must also be 
true substances from which all those aggregations result.22 
 
"Unum per se" is a Scholastic term often used by Leibniz, and here he tells us exactly what he 
means to imply: substantial form. As Christia Mercer notes, the Scholastics distinguished between 
unum per se and unum per accidens, wherein the former is derived from the nature of the substance 
                                                
          21. I believe that for Leibniz the difference comes from Scholastic thought, in that God is a simple 
being. The doctrine of simplicity implies that the attributes of God all collapse into one another (e.g., 
omniscience and omnipotence are identical in God). Simplicity, then, can imply something that 
indivisibility does not. And so simple substances perhaps mirror God's simplicity. This allows the simple 
substance which has no parts, to be at once a soul, an entelechy, an active force, perceiving, etc. Thus all 
the aspects of reality that Leibniz wants to explain can be explained through an infinitude of simple 
substances, which implies much more than indivisibility. Nonetheless, I will argue that unity is the primary 
concept of reality, and that this in turn suggests simples. 
          22. Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, Texts, 123. 
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itself. As to unum per accidens, Leibniz holds this to be a "phenomenal unity," an aggregate.23 It was 
common in seventeenth century German philosophy to hold that every substance has being (ens) 
and every being is unum per se, one in itself; that is, unity is derived from within, from its own 
being. And it is this reasoning which Leibniz wholeheartedly accepts.24 A true unity is unum per se, 
which is a unity that is not accidental. What Leibniz does not seem to mean by "unum per se" is 
simple substance (at least in this context). Body, then, is merely an aggregate, unum per accidens, if 
it lacks a soul. 
I accept that a body on its own, without a soul, has only a unity of aggregation; but the 
reality which it still possesses derives from the parts which make it up, and which retain 
their substantial unity because of the countless living bodies which are contained within 
them.25 
 
A unity of aggregation is only based on external denomination, like a heap of stones. Without the 
soul, there is only a collection of bodies: but each of these bodies will be substantially unified. He 
further writes: "if there are aggregates of substances, then necessarily there must also be true 
substances from which all those aggregations result."26 These substances found in aggregates are 
the reason he concludes that there are substantial forms. In an illuminating passage, he says: 
For I believe I have shown that there must be entelechies if there are corporeal substances; 
and if we accept these entelechies or these souls, we have to recognize their ingenerability 
and their indestructibility.27 
 
And so, we have the clear structure of his argument. Contrary to the Cartesians, an aggregate 
must at some point be an aggregate of things with real unity. Otherwise, there is no aggregate. The 
                                                
          23. Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687, Texts, 131. 
          24. Christia Mercer, "Leibniz and Sleigh on Substantial Unity," Leibniz: Nature and Freedom, 66. 
          25. Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, Texts, 126. 
          26. Ibid., 123. 
          27. 9 October 1687, Texts,133. 
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real unities of these aggregates are corporeal substances. And if there are corporeal substances, 
there must also be substantial forms. In addition, these forms must be indestructible, and cannot 
be generated by any natural means. Elsewhere he says, "the substantial form of the body is 
indivisible."28 Bringing much of this argument together, he writes: 
I can say at least that if there are no corporeal substances of the kind that I have in mind, 
then bodies will only be true phenomena, like the rainbow. Because not only is a 
continuum divisible to infinity, but every part of matter is actually divided into other parts 
. . . And since that goes on and on in the same way, you will never arrive at something of 
which you can say it is a true being until you find animated machines, the substantial 
form of which produces a substantial unity which is independent of the external union of 
contact. And if there are none, it follows that except for man there is nothing substantial 
in the visible world.29 
 
Without a stopping point, bodies would only be true phenomena (which implies that 
some bodies are more than true phenomena). These stopping points are corporeal substances, 
which he identifies as animated machines. The substantial forms of these machines produces a 
unity independent of external forces. And if there are no substantial forms, then nothing in the 
visible world would be real. They are the ingenerable and indestructible sources of unity. The 
substance having genuine unity—i.e., having a substantial form—is a corporeal substance, since this 
is what is made one by the form. But how do they confer unity? Leibniz solemnly admits that "we 
will never find anything systematic which can make a true substance out of beings by 
aggregation."30 But in answer to this challenge (a challenge Arnauld pressures him with) he says: 
I reply that it is the animated substance to which the matter belongs that is truly one 
being, and the matter taken as a mass in itself is only a pure phenomenon or well-founded 
appearance, as also are space and time. It does not even have the fixed and precise 
                                                
          28. 28 November/ 8 December 1686, Texts,117. 
          29. Ibid., 118-119. 
          30. 30 April 1687, Texts, 127. 
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qualities which could make it pass as a determinate being, as I have already suggested in 
my previous letter. For shape itself, which is the essence of a bounded mass, is never exact 
and strictly determinate in nature, because of the actual division to infinity of the parts of 
matter. There is never a sphere without irregularities, no straight line without curves 
mixed in with it, no curve of any finite nature which is not combined with a different one. 
. . . I could say the same thing of size and of motion, namely that they are qualities or 
predicates which partake of the phenomenal, as do colours and sounds; although they 
contain more that is distinctly knowable, they too cannot sustain a final analysis, and 
therefore since extended mass considered without entelechies consists only of these 
qualities, it is not a corporeal substance, but a pure phenomenon, just like the rainbow.31 
 
A Phenomenalist, looking at the first sentence of this passage, could interpret it as evidence that 
bodies are purely phenomenal and "animated substances" are not corporeal. The sentence 
(considering it apart from the rest of the passage for the moment) is ambiguous. It is not clear 
what Leibniz means here by an "animated substance," since he can be read as drawing a line, with 
substance on one side and the matter on the other as a pure phenomenon. I think this is 
incorrect. Consider that there is a difference between "animated" and "animating." The latter 
would be the substantial form, and the former a corporeal substance. Leibniz says that the matter 
"belongs" to the animated substance, which could either imply an external relation, as when we 
say that a house or car belongs to us, or an internal (perhaps substantive) relation, as when we 
might say that a particular thought was "my idea." Note that he writes:  
I could not say exactly whether there are true corporeal substances other than those which 
are animated . . . . if you ask me about the sun, the globe of the earth, the moon, trees and 
similar bodies, and even animals, I could not say with absolute certainty whether they are 
animated—or at least whether they are substances—or whether they are simply machines or 
aggregations of several substances.32 
 
                                                
          31. 9 October 1687, Texts, 131-2. 
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Corporeal substances are "animated" by souls or entelechies. And "there is no soul without an 
animated body."33 The body and soul together are a corporeal substance. Also consider: 
As for corporeal substances, I hold that mass, considering only what is divisible in it, is a 
pure phenomenon; that every substance has a true unity in metaphysical rigour, and that 
it is indivisible, ingenerable, and incorruptible. All matter must be filled with substances 
which are animated, or at least alive.34 
 
I also agree that all substantial forms and all substances are indestructible and ingenerable 
. . . They could therefore never come into existence except by an act of creation.35 
 
Corporeal substances are animated substances. When considering only what is divisible in mass 
(that is, when we look with our Cartesian eye) we are right to say it is pure phenomenon. But 
when we consider the metaphysical foundations, mass is a true unity if it is animated by a 
substantial form. Leibniz is thus distinguishing between 'matter' and 'mass', where the latter is 
considered formless. Hence he writes in the above passage that "matter taken as a mass in itself is 
only a pure phenomenon," but that matter belongs to that which is "truly one being." In this 
context, it is matter that belongs to a corporeal substance, and mass that is phenomenal. As he 
writes in the same passage, "it is the form that gives determinate being to matter."36 And in a 
marginal note he did not include in the letter to Arnauld, he says: 
If we take as the matter of corporeal substance, not its mass without forms, but a 
secondary matter which is the multitude of substances whose mass is that of the whole 
body, it can be said that these substances are parts of this matter, as those which enter into 
our body are parts of it. For as our body is the matter and the soul is the form of our 
substance, it is the same in this respect with other corporeal substances.37 
 
                                                
          33. 9 October 1687, Texts, 134. 
          34. Ibid., 135. 
          35. 28 November/ 8 December 1686, Texts, 117. 
          36. Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687, Papers and Letters, 343. 
          37. Ibid., 350. 
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 Matter belongs to a corporeal substance, and mass does not. As Loemker notes: "Mass is 
not equivalent to matter but is a quantitative measure of inertia, or materia prima as experienced 
in materia secunda," that is, mass is the primary matter contained in secondary matter.38 Leibniz 
writes, "Primary matter is mass itself, in which there is nothing but extension and antitypy or 
impenetrability."39 Primary matter is elsewhere defined as a resistance or the ability (force) of 
being acted upon.40 Considered to be that which is acted upon or formed to become something, 
mass in itself is not a thing, but a lump to be formed by an entelechy. Mass is nothing but 
extension, which is to say, it is not a real being in itself, but can provide the "stuff" to be formed. 
If Leibniz had meant "belongs" to refer to an extrinsic relation, implying that the matter belonged 
to the animated substance the way in which my clothes belong to me, then he would have used 
the term "mass." Since he clearly distinguishes between matter and mass; and it is mass, not 
matter, which is considered to be phenomenal, we ought to conclude that "belongs" is meant in 
the sense of "the body of a corporeal substance." And this implies unity and form, rather than 
phenomenon. So in answer to Arnauld's question on how the many, that is the matter, become 
one through the substantial form, Leibniz answers that the matter does not become one in itself. 
Rather, what is truly one being is the animated substance "to which the matter belongs." And this 
is a corporeal substance. The "animated substance" is neither the body nor the entelechy, but both 
taken together. 
                                                
          38. Ibid., 451. 
          39. Letter to Jacob Thomasius, 20/30 April 1669, Papers and Letters, 95. 
          40. Specimen Dynamicum, in Texts, 156. 
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And matter is filled with animated substances, i.e., corporeal substances. The bodies of 
these corporeal substances are likewise filled. A form animates matter (the action of animation is 
the constitutive difference between a mere mass and an individuated body), the result of which is 
an animated substance. So bodies are collections of form-matter amalgams; and the bodies or 
matter inside these collections break down in similar fashion. But notice that we never get to 
mere matter or unsubstantial stuff. We only find more animated substances. So the picture Leibniz 
gives us is of forms animating aggregates of embodied forms, which are in turn aggregates of 
embodied forms—there are forms unifying and underling forms all the way down. Cartesian 
matter, then, when resolved fully, yields nothing but forms. These are both mortar and block of 
the world. They are the unity and diversity of nature. What they build, in this omni-layered 
ontological portrait, are corporeal substances. 
What, then, is the ontological status of forms? If they could be destroyed by natural 
means, then what they unified would not constitute true unities. And if they were not in some 
way substantial, then they could not impart substantiality to anything. They must be at least as 
real as that which they reify. This implies that forms must also be substances—otherwise they could 
not produce substances. And so the substantiality of forms follows from his resolution of matter 
into forms.41 This is why I believe Leibniz considers forms to be substances. 
However, we noted earlier that in his Fardella memo Leibniz denies that souls are 
substances; he insists, rather, that they are substantial forms (which would imply that forms are 
not substances). This tension can be explained if we see Leibniz as being in transition, as it were, 
                                                
          41. Ibid., 350. 
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as he deals with the pressure put upon him by Arnauld. Arnauld pushes him to answer for the 
unity of corporeal substances, and he is here beginning to form what I consider his "mature" 
answer to the question. In the Fardella memo (written at the end of his correspondence with 
Arnauld) he says souls are not substances, but substantial forms; yet in this same memo (as we 
also noted earlier) he says simple substances are in all things. A soul is not a substance, because 
then, a corporeal substance would have a substance as a part. But substances are neither parts of 
things nor have parts themselves. Therefore, a soul (which is by definition an element or first 
principle of a corporeal substance) cannot be a substance; yet he still must identify it with simple 
substance. This tension will be the subject of the next chapter. And it is plausible that what we 
find in the Fardella memo is Leibniz working out his explanation, identifying substantial forms 
with simple substances, as he apparently does later, in 1695, when he writes in the New System: 
I saw that these forms and souls had to be indivisible, like our minds . . . But this truth 
reintroduced all the great difficulties about origin and duration of souls and forms. For, 
since every simple substance which has a genuine unity can begin or end only by a miracle, 
it follows that they can come into being only by creation and end only by annihilation. So 
I had to recognize that (with the exception of souls which God intends to create specially) 
the constitutive forms of substances must have been created with the world and must 
always continue to exist.42 
 
And even later in the Monadology: 
 
We could give the name entelechy to all simple substances or created monads . . .  If we 
want to call anything that has perceptions and appetites in the general sense that I have just 
explained a soul, then all simple substances or created monads could be called souls.43 
 
And so Leibniz seems to say that substantial forms are simple substances. But there are 
two questions that arise: (1) what is Leibniz's argument for simple substances, and (2) what 
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connection is there between substantial forms and simple substances? As to the first question, 
Levey notes that Leibniz never really articulates an argument for simple substances apart from the 
existence of composite, or corporeal, substances.44 Consider again his opening comments to the 
Monadology, that "there must be simple substances, because there are composites."45 His 
supporting evidence, then, is linked to there being corporeal substances. The doctrine of 
substantial forms accounts for corporeal substances. And it appears that his doctrine of simples 
expands upon the theory of substantial forms.46 In later years he speaks with brevity, saying all 
things are reducible to simple substances. But it must be considered, that as late as 1714, Leibniz 
writes that "each monad, together with its own body, makes up a living substance."47 Passages like 
this must be either ignored or contorted to fit the stark landscape of the Phenomenalist. The 
living substance is something other than the monad. This obviously does not preclude or displace 
the reasons for why he first establishes the doctrine of simples—but rather, supports it. There is no 
evidence, as far as I have detected, that Leibniz discards the carefully argued position of his 
"middle years." But the Phenomenalist would seem to require this. The Phenomenalist's picture is 
that Leibniz's doctrine of simple substances replaces his corporeal theory (or alternatively, he is 
said to never seriously have thought about corporeal substances). What we do see, all the way to 
the end of his life, are the twin themes of simple and corporeal substances. The Phenomenalist 
                                                
          44. For the argument I present in this section, I am indebted to Samuel Levey's paper, "Leibniz and 
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          45. Texts, 268. 
          46. Levey, "Leibniz and Idealism." 
          47. Principles of Nature and Grace, in Texts, 260. 
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who advances the argument for simples, opposing them to corporeal substances, has got it wrong. 
That there are corporeal substances is the first premise in the argument for simple substances. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE UNITY OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE 
 
A "substance requires a true unity," and as we have seen, one of the major blocks to 
accepting corporeal substances in Leibniz's system is that there seem to be no resources available 
for explaining how they can be true unities.1 This is what Levey calls the "problem of construction," 
and in this chapter I will attempt to show how Leibniz can account for this unity.2 The challenge is 
to give an account, and to do this we will need to more closely examine some (differing) concepts 
of the monad. From this I will attempt to show how simples and composites are both, in a sense, 
monads. The source of similarity, I believe, is in the notion of unity, and this will help to solve the 
riddle of the union of a corporeal substance, as well as to explain how soul both is, and is not, 
substance. This solution will involve an integration of what I take to be the main themes of 
Leibniz's metaphysics, that of the unity and harmony of nature. As he says with regard to the 
agreement of body and soul: 
It is this mutual relationship, arranged in advance in each substance in the universe, which 
produces what we call their communication, and which alone constitutes the union of soul 
and body. And in this way we can understand how the soul has its seat in the body by an 
immediate presence, which is as close as could be, since the soul is in the body in the way 
in which unity is in that resultant of unities which is multiplicity.3 
 
I take this passage as a fundamental component in understanding Leibniz's vision of 
nature. A corporeal substance is, in the end, the harmony of its elements; yet this nonetheless 
                                                
          1. Leibniz to Arnauld, 28 November 1686, Philosophical Texts, 123. 
          2. Levey, "Leibniz and Idealism." 
          3. New System, in Texts, 151. 
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constitutes a true unity, and therefore, it is substantial. As he says to Des Bosses, "I do not deny 
some real metaphysical union between the soul and the organic body, according to which it can be 
said that the soul is truly in the body."4 In the following, I will try to explain how Leibniz sees the 
nature of this union, and in the last section I will suggest the starting point of a "new system" for 
interpreting his metaphysics. I stress that this will only be suggestive, since it marks the boundary of 
the current project, showing an avenue of further research. 
 
THREE MONADS 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Leibniz takes both simple and composite substance (i.e., 
corporeal substance) as belonging to the same overall picture of reality. The doctrine of simple 
substances appears to be an expansion on the doctrine of substantial forms. Nonetheless, Leibniz 
insists that monads are the only elements of things; but contrary to popular opinion, Leibniz does 
not therefore accept phenomenalism. The body of the corporeal substance is also said to be full of 
monads, which are less active, less perfect, more passive, and are in turn the substantial forms for 
other bodies. Monads, however, are also perceivers, and in this way Leibniz attempts to close the 
Cartesian gap between mind and body. Up until this point we have granted the general orthodoxy, 
that monads are simple minds bereft of bodies. For the Phenomenalist, the Leibnizian 
monadology is a Cartesian system with the material half sheered off. In addition to reasons already 
provided, this interpretation is strained when it is realized that Leibniz has at least three 
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definitions of "monad," and only one of these is a simple substance. In this section I will discuss 
these three definitions, and suggest a common ground among them—unity. This will allow for an 
integration of these three definitions into a more or less coherent theory, with corporeal 
substances at the ontological center. 
 It can immediately be seen how relying on the explanatory power of one notion could 
have appealed to Leibniz, since he has all along tried to combine the diverse elements of 
competing philosophies. Characterizing him as a reductionist is perhaps misleading, since his 
reduction is an attempt to blend competing views under a single explanation, using as few 
principles as possible. For example, Wilson notes that Leibniz made the following list of terms, 
composed probably between 1683 and 1685: 
Real being / apparent being (rainbow); 
 substance / accident; 
 unity per se / unity by aggregation (pile of wood); 
 matter / substantial form 
 complete being / incomplete being5 
 
She observes that he has the acumen to try merging these categories. He first makes 
contrasts—e.g., between real and apparent being, or substance and accident—and he is left with 
groups of similar things, like substance and unity per se. There is, for Leibniz, an ontological link 
between the similarities he draws. His reduction is not necessarily an elimination of any category, 
but a combining of categories, which eventually allows for the formation of two basic partitions that 
can be understood in a number of ways—substance can be understood in terms of real being or 
unity per se, and accident can be understood as apparent being or unity by aggregation. This seems 
                                                
          5. Wilson, Leibniz's Metaphysics, 180-181. 
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to have been one of his major projects, culminating, I believe, in the concept of the "monad." It is 
the fruit of his labor, and (I believe) he thinks, the ultimate explanation of things. For it is in this 
notion that he is able to combine or explain the two primary categories. With the monad he can 
elucidate the singleness of the mind, the changing material world, the appearances and forms of 
bodies, motion, being, apparent being, and so on.  
It is worth pointing out, that in the above diagram, matter is grouped on the left with real 
being, complete being and substance, while substantial form is placed on the right with apparent 
being and incomplete being. This is perhaps unexpected. The Phenomenalist might be inclined to 
say that he made a mistake. I believe, however, that there is a reason for this grouping, and Leibniz 
means exactly what we see. Substantial form, which is simple and identified with monads, is to be 
understood as incomplete being. Matter is complete, and is grouped with substance and real being. 
Consider this passage from 1698 (more than ten years later), where we find the first published use 
of the word "monad:" 
And it is this substantial principle which is called the soul in living things, and a substantial 
form in others, and in so far as together with matter it makes up a substance which is truly 
one, or one per se, it forms what I call a monad. For without these true and real unities there 
would only be beings through aggregation; indeed it would follow that there would be no 
real beings in bodies. For even though there are atoms of substance, namely my monads, 
which have no parts, there are no atoms of mass, or smallest extensions . . . . Secondary 
matter is indeed a complete substance, but it is not merely passive, whereas primary 
substance is merely passive, but is not a complete substance—there needs to be added to it a 
soul, or form analogous to a soul; a first entelechy, that is a striving or primitive active force 
which is itself an inherent law imprinted by divine decree . . . . But a 'spirit' is not to be 
understood here, as it usually is, as an intelligent being, but as a soul, or a form analogous 
to a soul; nor is it to be understood as a mere modification, but as something constitutive, 
substantial, and enduring—what I usually call a monad, which has something like perception 
and desire.6 
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It can be seen that Leibniz here introduces almost all the major themes. He talks of 
substantial form, perceiving and desiring, aggregation, matter, the complete and incomplete, one 
per se, and substance. Monads are identified as true and real unities, and they are explained in 
terms of resulting from a substantial form and matter. But then he ends by saying that the substantial 
form is a monad. So monads are also the forms of other monads, when they combine with matter. He 
also says secondary matter is a complete substance; and primary substance is not complete.7 And this 
is exactly what we would expect when we consider his diagram from the early 1680s. In order to be 
complete, secondary matter needs a soul or first entelechy. Thus, primary substance (i.e., 
substantial form) produces secondary matter, which is a complete substance (and it is in this that 
the primary substance is completed). It is this he calls a monad; but the body that is made real (this 
is the secondary matter) is an aggregate of substances. And so from top to bottom we are 
confronted with monads, playing triple-duty as matter, form, and the union of the two. 
Is he merely confused? After all, Leibniz's 'monad' is usually interpreted as a simple, mind-
like, immaterial substance. Clearly, the picture he gives us here is diverse, indicating there is more 
in this world than simple substances. Monads are both forms and form-matter composites. But 
Leibniz also has a third understanding of the 'monad': 
How far a piece of flint must be divided in order to arrive at organic bodies and hence at 
monads, I do not know. But it is easy to see that our ignorance in these things does not at 
all prejudice the matter itself. . . . I do not believe that there is any minimal animal or 
                                                
          7. Loemker says that Leibniz misleads us when he claims secondary matter is complete substance, 
"since secondary matter, as matter, is phenomenal, and only the aggregated monads whose passive force is 
expressed as resistance or inertia are substantial." (Papers and Letters, 508). Indeed, I concur with Loemker; 
but I feel this is no more than to point out that any thing considered without substantial unity is not truly 
unified. Leibniz would undoubtedly agree that secondary matter, considered simply in virtue of its being 
matter, is phenomenal. This does not, however, contradict the claim Leibniz makes in this passage. 
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living being, that there is any without an organic body, or any whose body is not further 
divisible into more substances. Therefore we never arrive at living points or points 
endowed with forms. 
 If you have a clear idea of the soul, you will also have one of forms, for they are the 
same genus but different species.8 
 
What I call a complete monad or individual substance [substantia singularis] is not so much 
the soul, as it is the animal itself, or something analogous to it, endowed with a soul or 
form and an organic body.9 
 
And so here introduces the notion of a complete monad, which is a soul and organic body. 
These are everywhere in nature. Indeed, divide a scrap of flint far enough and he does not deny 
that inside there are "organic bodies and hence monads." There is some identity or relation 
between the organic body and the monad, and he writes in Principles of Nature and Grace that, 
"Each monad, together with its own body, makes up a living substance."10 The living substance to 
which he refers would be the complete monad; hence, a monad together with its body he calls a 
complete monad. Presumably the monad without a body would be incomplete, comparable to the 
notion of incomplete being mentioned earlier. Consider, when Leibniz discusses the union of 
body and soul with Des Bosses, he mentions that an entelechy with its prime matter is the soul, 
which then conjoins with mass (other such monads). He writes, "But what, you may ask, shall we 
say of this primary matter itself, which belongs to the soul? I reply that it is certainly created 
together with the soul or that the whole monad is created."11 A "monad," then, can be understood 
as the union of form and matter. To De Volder he writes: "Properly and exactly speaking, perhaps 
we should not say that the primitive entelechy impels the mass of its own body but that it is merely 
                                                
          8. Leibniz to Bernoulli, 18 November 1698, Papers and Letters, 512. 
          9. Leibniz to Bernoulli, 20/30 September 1698, Essays, 168. 
          10. Ibid., 260. 
          11. Leibniz to Des Bosses, 30 April 1709, Papers and Letters, 598. 
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combined with a passive primitive power which it completes, or with which it constitutes a 
monad."12 Again, a monad is seen as a composite, but one which is complete.  
We can thus gather together three definitions for 'monad': (1) simple minds, souls or forms 
(wherein it is helpful to remember that he talks of forms as principles of life or unity, so that form 
implies matter), (2) a union of entelechy (or form) with matter, and (3) corporeal substances, that 
is, the living animal or complete monad.13 On definitions (2) and (3), a monad is a complete 
substance. It is one per se, a true unity. Yet on (1) a monad is simple, since forms (whether souls, 
minds, or entelechies) are absolutely without parts. This seems to imply a conflict in the overall 
concept of a monad, since it applies to both simple and complete substances. The issue, however, 
can be illuminated if we turn to the notion of unity. This will enable a better understanding of 
both simple and complete substances, and will provide a way to understand his monadic concept. 
Leibniz gives the following measured explanation of unity to Bourguet: 
When I say that unity is not further analyzable, I mean that it cannot have parts whose 
concept is simpler than it. Unity is divisible but not resolvable, for fractions, which are 
parts of unity, have less simple concepts than whole numbers, which are less simple than 
unity, since whole numbers always enter into the concepts of fractions. Many who have 
philosophized about the point and about unity in mathematics have become confused by 
failing to distinguish between analysis into concepts and division into parts. Parts are not 
always simpler than wholes, though they are always less than the whole. . . .14 
 
A unity, he says, is that which cannot be further analyzed into parts whose concepts are 
more simple that itself. It is "divisible but not resolvable." The confusion in this area (he points 
out) is due to not distinguishing between "analyzing into concepts" and "division into parts". His 
                                                
          12. Leibniz to De Volder, 20 June 1703, Papers and Letters, 529. 
          13. Cf. Phemister, "Compound Bodies," 71-72. 
          14.  Leibniz to Bourguet, 5 August 1715, Papers and Letters, 664-665. 
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suggestion is that even if something has parts (in this qualified sense of 'part') it may still be a unity, 
if the parts are not more simple than the whole ("less than" and "simpler" are not the same). The 
parts of a unity are compared with fractions, in that they "have less simple concepts" than the 
whole, since they in turn seem to imply the whole. They presume the unity, or are entailed by the 
nature of the unity, hence they are not less simple than the whole. The fractions (or divisions) of a 
unity are not true parts of the unity, but are aspects or elements of the whole. Simplicity, then, is 
the pivotal concept in his analysis of unity. 
In Principles of Nature and Grace he says a simple substance is that which has no parts.15 
Simple substances are unities, and in this context he refers to them as "completely simple."16 And 
in the Monadology: "in that which has no parts, neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is 
possible. And so monads are the true atoms of nature; in a word, the elements of things."17 And in 
a note written to (but not sent to) Arnauld, he says: 
The difficulties which arise in these matters come, among other things, from the fact that 
we do not commonly have a sufficiently distinct concept of the whole and the part. In the 
last analysis, the part is nothing but an immediate component of the whole and is in some 
way homogeneous to it. Thus parts can constitute a whole, whether it has or has not true 
unity. It is true that a whole which is a true unity can remain the same individual in a 
rigorous sense even when it loses or gains parts, as we experience in ourselves. Thus the 
parts are its immediate requisites only pro tempore.18 
 
Based on these passages, we may say that what has no parts is simple, and is (therefore) a 
unity. But the reverse does not seem to hold, since Leibniz tells Bourguet that a unity may have 
parts, as long as the parts are not simpler than the whole. And the parts of a whole are only parts 
                                                
          15. Texts, 258. 
          16. Ibid., 259. 
          17. Ibid., 268. 
          18. Papers and Letters, 350. 
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pro tempore, or "only for the time being." What is simple is unified, but what is unified is not 
necessarily simple. The criterion for something to count as a substance, however, is not simplicity, 
but unity. That which is one per se is a substance, since there is a reciprocal relationship between 
one and being. As far as I can tell, Leibniz does not give the same reciprocity to the notion 
simplicity (i.e., he does not say "simple" and "being" are reciprocal). 
Unity is the benchmark of what is and is not substance. In the case of simplicity, there are 
absolutely no parts or concepts more simple that itself; while a non-simple unity may perhaps still 
be divided (though these divisions do not admit a further conceptual analysis of the unity). There 
must be simple substances (as we have seen Leibniz argue), since these are the end of the road for 
all analysis. Therefore, simple substances cannot themselves be analyzed.19 Indeed, mirroring this 
distinction, we find that he differentiates between substantial forms as the building blocks, and 
corporeal substances as "complete substances." He writes: 
a slab of marble is not a single complete substance, any more than the water in a pond 
together with all its fish would be, even if all the water and all the fish were frozen together 
. . . . There is as much difference between a substance and a being of that kind as there is 
between a man and a group such as a nation, an army, a society, or a college.20 
 
A slab of marble is not a "complete substance." The marble is compared with an army (as 
an example of unum per accidens); the army is in turn contrasted with a man—the man, however, is 
compared with a "complete substance." This suggests that the soul completes the body, i.e., makes 
it a complete substance. Souls are never without animated bodies; animated bodies are never 
                                                
          19. "Analyzed" in this context means to be understood in terms of parts. But simples have no parts, so 
they cannot be 'analyzed' in this manner. 
          20. Leibniz to Arnauld, 28 November/ 8 December 1686, Texts, 118. 
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without souls. These come together naturally.21 Such unifying principles are "atoms of substance, 
that is to say real unities absolutely devoid of parts . . . the absolute first principles of the 
composition of things, and as it were the ultimate elements in the analysis of substances 
(substantial things)."22 They have absolutely no parts, and are (therefore) real unities. They are the 
"ultimate elements in the analysis of substances." These atoms can only be simple substances 
themselves, and they are the final stop in analysis. 
Any complete substance can thus be analyzed into these absolute components. In a letter 
drafted to Pierre Bayle, Leibniz says that simple substances are active principles, and he explicitly 
mentions he follows Aristotle in calling them primitive entelechies.23 And so souls, substantial 
forms, entelechies, atoms of substance, are all simple. These are tendencies "in all substances."24 
Any substance containing such a tendency (or a principle) is a complete substance, and these are the 
true unities or corporeal substances of his ontology. Secondary matter is complete when it has a first 
entelechy, which is a primitive force, or an "inherent law" imprinted by God. The fact that he 
identifies simple substances as entelechies is significant in this context, and the locution of 
"imprinting" becomes particularly interesting, since for Aristotle an entelechy presupposes the 
existence of matter. It informs or completes the matter, making it a this. Leibniz seems to follow 
Aristotle, then, when he talks of a first entelechy. The entelechy is the imprint on matter, which 
completes it, making it one being. 
                                                
          21. 9 October 1687, Texts, 134. 
          22. Ibid., 149. 
          23. Ibid. 
          24. Ibid., 255. 
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 Leibniz's mature doctrine of monads, I believe, is best captured as an ontology of true or 
real unities; and a real unity is a monad. This helps to establish a continuity of thought between 
the middle and later periods of Leibniz's development, as he preserves the notion of unity in the 
monad. Some monads are simple, and some are a form-matter composite (i.e., a body and soul), 
yet both are essentially unities. He considers the composite or corporeal substance, which he also 
calls a living substance or animal, a complete substance, i.e., a complete monad. On the other 
hand, simples are the elements of all things, since they are the ultimate stopping points in the 
analysis of both parts and concepts. But a simple substance, that is, a form, is incomplete without a 
body. 
How is something that is simple incomplete, as if it were missing something? By the very 
definition of the term, something simple cannot be missing a part, so the incompleteness cannot 
be of this sort. A simple substance is incomplete without a body, in the sense that it is imperfect, a 
bare principle, unable to act. That which is more perfect completes that which is less perfect. And 
what is thus completed cannot be separated. God has created body and soul together. Consider: 
But what, you may ask, shall we say of this primary matter itself, which belongs to the soul? 
I reply that it is certainly created together with the soul or that the whole monad is created. 
Then does not primary matter increase or decrease? I acknowledge that it does, since it is 
only primitive passive power.25 
 
The primitive passive power of a monad can increase or decrease. "Primitive passive power," as we 
will see in the next section, corresponds to the body. And here Leibniz says it may be augmented 
or diminished. Consider that a body is an infinite collection of substances belonging to a soul or 
entelechy—any division of the body can never reduce it to a point where it is separated from the 
                                                
          25. Leibniz to Des Bosses, 30 April 1709, Papers and Letters, 598. 
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soul. Since there is no amount of chopping that can obliterate the body, it can never be severed 
from the soul. It can only diminish, though never utterly, for it is never less than an infinite 
collection. Once granted, body and soul are an un-sunderable unity. 
 Body and soul are linked; yet it can be seen that the term "monad" pivots on the notion of 
unity, which cannot be analyzed into something more simple. What is simple would be incomplete 
if it did not have a body. What is complete would be a mere aggregate without the soul. Leibniz's 
mature doctrine seems to be that form, matter and mind are all of the same cloth, but folded upon 
itself repeatedly, infinitely, with only differences of degree between them. Monads, or true unities, 
are in every nook of existence, distinguished by their differing degrees of perfection. They are 
flexible enough to play the diverse roles a full-bodied metaphysic requires. There are times when 
Leibniz uses "monad" to refer to simples which imply unity, and at other times to refer to unity which 
implies simples.  
 In spite of what I have argued, we should note that there is textual support for the view 
that there are only simples, which would imply that there are no other kinds of unity. For example, 
he writes to De Volder that, "only simple things are true thing, and the rest are beings by 
aggregation and therefore phenomena, existing as Democritus put it, by convention but not by 
nature."26 At face value this would seem to undercut my analysis of unity, but the correspondence 
with De Volder is rich with references to corporeal substances. It is here that he produces a crucial 
passage (in fact in this very letter which I have just quoted) describing the anatomy of the relations 
between simples and corporeal substances. This particular passage will be the focus of the next 
                                                
          26. Leibniz to De Volder, 20 June 1703, Papers and Letters, 531. 
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section, and will prove valuable in understanding the Leibnizian project with regards to the reality 
of corporeal substance.  
We can point out that two sentences before declaring that "only simple things are true 
things," Leibniz says that corporeal substances are "made one" by a dominating monad.27 How can 
corporeal substances be one if there are only simples? Leibniz is either entirely befuddled, or he 
means to imply that corporeal substances are simple. The third option, that he means to reject 
corporeal substances as nothing more than aggregates, is in my view unsupportable given the 
evidence in the correspondence (as well as the reasons I have already provided). I believe the most 
appropriate interpretation is that he identifies corporeal substances as simple, in this context at 
least, and this merely reinforces the view that they have real unity. He may have spoken somewhat 
loosely (as he does from time to time, moving from correspondence to correspondence). But if 
nothing else this should indicate that he seems, at least at this point in time, to consider corporeal 
substances as being truly one, and perhaps simple. 
I think the interpretation that corporeal substances are simple is too strong, and Leibniz 
may not have ultimately thought of them in this way. However, I think it clear that they are at least 
true unities, and this is enough to support a more comprehensive reading of his system. Monads, 
understood as true unities (which are either simple or compound), are the foundation of his 
mature thought. And at the ontological center is the complete monad, that is, the corporeal 
substance.  
 
                                                
          27. Ibid. 
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RELATUS AD 
  
The veracity of this outcome may be questioned. After all, some very puzzling things 
emerge in this picture of reality. For example, how can Leibniz hold that many substances come 
together as one substance? This is of course one of the stumbling blocks for any reading of Leibniz 
committed to the reality of corporeal substances. Simply because a view is difficult or problematic, 
however, is no reason for saying that Leibniz does not believe it, especially if there is evidence that 
he does. If we refrained from attributing problematic views to philosophers, we would likely 
attribute little more than modus ponens to any thinker. And Leibniz is no shrinking violet when it 
comes to attacking the Gordian Knots of philosophy. In fact, he seems at times to dance on the 
edge of inconsistency as he grapples to bring disparate traditions in tandem. If there are problems 
with the view, then so be it; our next step should be to find how Leibniz addresses the difficulties. 
One initial problem with taking this "next step" is that he says a created substance, in a 
strict metaphysical sense, has no influence over another.28 The only influence monads have on 
each other is ideal.29 He tells Arnauld that we will never find a systematic way to produce a real 
substance from an aggregate.30 He writes to De Volder that the metaphysical union of body and 
soul is not a "phenomenon, and we do not have any notion of it or acquaintance with it."31 He 
then promptly denies being able to provide an account. His denial, however, is not necessarily a 
                                                
          28. New System, in Texts, 149. 
          29. Ibid., 150. 
          30. Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, Texts, 127. 
          31. Leibniz to De Volder, 19 January 1706, Essays, 184. 
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rejection of corporeal substance, since if unity is neither phenomenal nor ideal, what remains is 
real unity. It is real, though in the final analysis he is unable to (fully) explain it. 
In spite of his avowed inability to settle the issue, I think Leibniz gives the basic structure of 
an answer. In fact, it is the very problem of interaction among substances that he says leads him 
gradually to a surprising idea of "very considerable attraction," which he finds gives an even stronger 
basis for the unity of body and soul.32 Discussing with Arnauld how substances cannot be said to 
causally interact, he writes: 
…each individual substance expresses the whole universe entirely in its own way and 
according to a certain relation, or, so to speak, in accordance with the point of view from 
which it regards it . . . So every individual substance or complete being is like a world apart, 
independent of everything else except God . . . But this independence does not rule out 
intercourse between substances; for since all created substances are continually produced 
by the same sovereign being in accordance with the same plans, and express the same 
universe or the same phenomena, they fit in with one another precisely. And that leads us 
to say that one acts on the other, because one expresses more distinctly than the other the 
cause or reason for the changes, rather in the way that we attribute motion to a boat rather 
than to the whole sea. . . . This is why, when it is a question of the union of the soul and 
the body, or of the activity or passivity of a mind with respect to another created thing, 
many people have had to agree that their direct intercourse is inconceivable. . . . There is 
therefore only the theory of concomitance, or of the mutual agreement of substances, which 
explains everything in a manner which is comprehensible and worthy of God, and which 
indeed is demonstrable and inevitable in my view given the proposition that we have just 
established. It seems to me that it also fits in with the freedom of rational creatures much 
better than does the theory of impressions, or that of occasional causes. God created the soul 
from the outset in such a way that standardly there is no need for any such alterations.33 
 
The complete causal separation of each substance ensures both the freedom and unity of 
consciousness. But this introduces the problem of real union between body and soul, which he 
says is not ruled out. The mutual agreement of substances, assured by the divine plan, provides for 
                                                
          32. New System, in Texts, 150. 
          33. Leibniz to Arnauld, 4/14 July 1686, Texts, 112-113. 
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this. One substance is said to act on another when it more distinctly contains the reason for 
change than the other. If the reason that substance S1 carries out action A is found in S2 more 
distinctly than it is found in S1, then we can say that S2 has caused S1 to do A. Direct intercourse 
does not happen, but something "worthy of God" takes place. There is a mutual agreement among 
all substances everywhere, with various degrees of harmony among the clarity of their reasons for 
acting. The theory of concomitance, Leibniz says, is more able to uphold the freedom of rational 
creatures. Since nothing from the "outside" actually causes a substance to act in a certain way, the 
rational substance is free. Each substance is the wellspring of its own activity. The alternative 
would be to say that something "outside" causes the action of a substance, which seems more a 
denial or compromise of freedom. And so, each substance follows its own laws, with all laws 
operating in perfect harmony, so that body and soul are united without causal association: 
What happens to the soul comes from its own depths, without its needing thereafter to 
accommodate itself to the body, any more than the body does to the soul. Each one follows 
its own laws (the one acting freely, the other without choice), they correspond, the one 
with the other, in the same phenomena.34  
 
God creates every monad, that is, every true unity, to be the source of its own activity. 
However, they were created also to be in perfect agreement with one another, and this produces 
the same effect as though they were externally communicating. From this follows the union of 
body and soul. But this is no mere external union. The external interaction of substances might be 
nothing more than accidental interaction, based on their modifications, rather than real unity. He 
considers his solution to be deeper, giving an even closer relation that amounts to an internal, pre-
arranged unity. Thus, the unity of corporeal substance is a result of the pre-established harmony of 
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God's plan. Simplicity is one basis for unity; harmony is the other. A harmony of simple 
substances results in a corporeal substance if and only if there is a single principle of life (which is 
what he calls a monad in his New Essays) dominating the collection.35 Accidental unity perhaps has 
some of the hallmarks of true unity, but such unity is incomplete, merely a heap of independent 
entities. 
The most basic explanation of the union of body and soul is that their mutual relation is 
fixed in the plan of God, in a faultless harmony among all the things of this world. It cannot be 
over-stressed that this concomitance is as fixed as any other aspect of nature, resulting from the 
beginning. The union does not just occur through natural processes, any more than simple 
substances can result from external pressures—internal principles cannot be created through 
external forces. Both simple and corporeal substances can only be created through Divine power. 
The harmony of simple substances is explained in terms of the fit between matter and form, or the 
passive and active aspects of simples. Each simple is the source of its own activity, so a corporeal 
substance would be full of independent contractors. But the harmony among the passive and 
active forces of these independent contractors are pre-calibrated to complete the same project. 
These forces do not merely interact (since direct interaction does not take place), but rather 
complete one another. And if there is one architect, say, overseeing the project, then the project is 
executed with real unity. So, I should imagine, we could analogize the relationship of the monads 
in the corporeal substance. 
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As mentioned in the previous section, when he writes to De Volder, Leibniz gives one of 
the more complete accounts of how he sees the structure. 
If you take mass [massa] to be an aggregate containing many substances, you can, however, 
conceive in it one substance that is preeminent, if that mass makes up an organic body, 
animated by its primary entelechy. Furthermore, along with the entelechy, I don't put 
anything into the monad or the complete simple substance, but the primitive passive force, 
a force corresponding to [relatus ad] the whole mass [massa] of the organic body. The 
remaining subordinate monads placed in the organs don't constitute a part of the 
substance, but yet they are immediately required for it, and they come together with the 
primary monad in a corporeal substance, that is, in an animal or plant. Therefore I 
distinguish: (1) the primitive entelechy or soul; (2) the matter, namely, the primary matter 
or primitive passive power; (3) the monad made up of these two things; (4) the mass [massa] 
or secondary matter, or the organic machine in which innumerable subordinate monads 
come together; and (5) the animal, that is, the corporeal substance, which the dominating 
monad in the machine makes one.36 
 
 He tells us the monad contains only an entelechy and primitive passive force, and these 
seem to complete the monad. The primitive passive force in the dominant monad corresponds to the 
whole mass of the organic body. The body itself is composed of monads, but not as parts—all bodies 
are aggregates of corporeal substances, and the parts of a body are other aggregates. Like a three-
dimensional puzzle with each piece made of more puzzle pieces. The aggregate is the basic unit of 
the body. And the monads are necessary conditions for the body—they "come together" with the 
dominant monad in the corporeal substance, which he calls an animal or plant. Monads are 
neither parts of the body nor parts of the corporeal substance. They are as points to a line. But 
they are more than simply points, since monads are active and passive. 
Not just any body can be animated by an entelechy. It has to be an organic machine, 
secondary matter, which is a mass full of simple substances. A body that is an organic machine is 
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therefore different from a phenomenon, since it contains innumerable substances (phenomena 
don't contain substances, but are modes of them). These substances are organized in such a way 
that the machine is a machine all the way down to the foundations. 
Now, the whole body corresponds to the primitive passive force of the dominant monad. 
The phrase he uses, "relatus ad," means roughly, to bear or carry back; to report; relate. So the passive 
force of the dominant monad and the body relate to each other. This is the issue he is unable to 
resolve, and his answer seems more a general description, rather than a full explanation. We know 
that he does not intend this correspondence to be an external communication, for that would 
reduce the whole structure to something like the interaction of marbles in a pouch (unity per 
accidens). The communion here is more intimate. And he does say that the monads are in the 
corporeal substance. The dominant monad does not have some external roost; and the soul, he 
writes, "has its seat in the body by an immediate presence, which is as close as could be."37 The 
active force of the dominant monad is immediately present, and the source of unity in a body. The 
relation is as close as could be, as he says, and must be considered internal to the corporeal 
substance. 
Leibniz writes that, "along with the entelechy, I don't put anything into the monad or the 
complete simple substance, but the primitive passive force." In this context he uses the term 
"monad" to refer to a union of an entelechy with primary passive force (prime matter), so his usage 
of "monad" does not denote simple or corporeal substance.  What he therefore means by "monad" 
here is complete simple substance. He then says that the primitive passive force (of the complete 
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simple substance or monad) relates to (relatus ad) the secondary matter, which is the organic body. 
The union of a corporeal substance, then, comes down to the interpretation of "relatus ad."  If this 
relation is "as close as could be," and is internal to the one (or unity per se), then I think it is 
reasonable to interpret "relatus ad" as signifying that the primitive passive force of the monad 
(which he says is in the monad) is the organic body. In this way, I think, Leibniz considers corporeal 
substance one substance. If it is one (which he affirms in this passage) then the relations of the 
elements that "come together" cannot be thought of as external, and are best thought of as a 
relation a thing has to itself.38 This helps to clarify the senses of "monad" previously mentioned. A 
form or soul, as an element or "part" of a corporeal substance, is not a substance. It is a principle of 
life, the substantial unity of the whole. Substances are not parts of anything, and they cannot be 
constructed from parts. The complete monad is the coupling of an entelechy with primary matter, 
and the primary matter (when it is thus informed) is the organic body. 
How then does this relation come about? I think the key to this lies in aggregates and 
points of view, since these are what will help us understand primary and secondary matter. Leibniz 
is, perhaps more than anyone else in the history of philosophy, devoted to unity as a primary 
concept, holding everything else to be aggregation. It comes down to this intense interest in unity 
and aggregation, as the fundamental way of explaining the relation and completion of monads and 
corporeal substances. I suggest that monads are dominated only in this way: insofar as they belong 
to an aggregate, to a mass, they can be dominated by a more perfect monad. Monads are never 
isolated and conquered. They naturally belong to and/or dominate aggregates. Consider that 
                                                
          38. Cf. Phemister, Leibniz and the Natural World, 39. I am indebted to Phemister for the relation 
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Leibniz claims we always perceive the world by means of our bodies, and the domination of a 
monad is always over a body. 
The monad is both active and passive. The active is perception, activity, life, and the 
passive is primary matter, which is fallow and incomplete. Leibniz holds that primary matter is 
passive and separated from souls, and he writes that to say "it is merely passive is just the same" as 
saying that "it is separated from all activity" and "what is incomplete is the active without the 
passive and the passive without the active."39 The soul is the active force (we could say principle) of 
the body; the body is the passive force (or principle) of the soul. Primary passive force is a result of 
the coming together or aggregation of simples. The aggregate itself (which contains simple and 
corporeal substances) is the passive principle upon which the soul or entelechy acts. Primary matter 
(or primary passive force) is (1) the "primitive force of being acted upon;"40 (2) "the same in all 
bodies and proportional to their size;"41 and (3) what is passive in the monad, the primary matter, 
is what is inactive from a point of view.42 Furthermore: 
It is active in so far as what can be clearly understood in it serves to explain what happens 
in the other; and it is passive in so far as the explanation for what happens in it is to be 
found in what is known distinctly in the other.43 
 
A monad dominates matter, or what is passive, incomplete, and imperfect. This matter will be an 
aggregate of other less perfect monads, which fall within the scope of the dominating monad's 
point of view. But there is an emerging difficulty, since Leibniz claims that they are (or contain) 
                                                
          39. Leibniz to Bernoulli, Essays, 167. 
          40. Specimen Dynamicum, in Texts, 156. 
          41. Nature Itself, in Texts, 216. 
          42. Monadology, ibid., 219. 
          43. Ibid., 275. 
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both passive and active forces, and this primary matter (in the monad) is everywhere the same and 
only passive from a point of view. But how can both be true? How can something that is active (and is 
defined as activity) be also passive? The indication is that a monad cannot be truly passive, when 
we consider the monad itself, in its own right. It is fully and always active, a source of activity, 
never ceasing and only limited by its own native perceptions. But he clearly says that the monad is 
passive (even though from a point of view) and that what is passive is also to be considered matter, 
and incomplete. The answer that seems best to me is to understand form and matter in terms of 
wholes and parts, unities and aggregates. Consider: 
It is only atoms of substance, that is to say, real unities absolutely devoid of parts, that can be 
the sources of actions, and the absolute first principles of the composition of things, and as it 
were the ultimate elements in the analysis of substances [substantial things]. They might be 
called metaphysical points; they have something of the nature of life and a kind of perception, and 
mathematical points are their point of view for expressing the universe.44 
 
Yet the soul is nevertheless the form of the body, because it expresses the phenomena of all 
other bodies according to their relation to its own.45 
 
 Soul is the form of the body "because it expresses the phenomena of all other bodies 
according to their relations to its own." In other words, the form of the body is that which 
expresses all relations other bodies have to its body. So form is what individuates a body from all 
other bodies—it is what makes it a body in the first place. The form is one thing, in that it expresses 
all relations of other bodies to its body from the same point of view. So, in the same way that a 
substance expresses all its predicates, the soul expresses all the relations of other bodies to its body. 
By relating to all other bodies through the soul, the soul both distinguishes (individuates) the body 
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          45. Leibniz to Arnauld, 4/14 July 1686, Texts, 112-113. 
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from all other bodies, and unifies it, since the soul has a single point of view on the universe. The 
point of view must be (or belong to) a metaphysical/mathematical point—i.e., a simple—or else there 
would be no unity. It is this activity which endows numerical identity on the body. We could say 
that this completes the aggregate (in which case it is no longer 'officially' an aggregate).  
A monad in an aggregate will be passive with regard to the aggregate as a whole. The whole 
is the result of a substantial form or primary active force. Monads are all active; yet they belong to a 
body when they are dominated by another monad with a better (i.e., more perfect) point of view. 
So from the standpoint of the whole body, each monad in the body is passive, and can be 
dominated by an entelechy. The complete aggregate (which is not a true aggregate) is a corporeal 
substance. A monad is therefore active in itself, without parts, the fountainhead of its own unity 
and efficacy; yet as an element of an aggregate the monad is passive, that is, able to be acted upon. 
This is why, I believe, Leibniz talks of souls as substances, and at other times (as in the 
Fardella memo) he denies it. On occasion, he says substantial forms or souls are primitive active 
force, and he neglects his definition of the monad as primitive active and passive force. He can do 
this because a monad is, in different contexts (or from different "points of view") all of these 
things. I think this helps explain some of the discrepancy attributed to Leibniz. 
The unity of a corporeal substance follows because monads are simple and have no parts, so 
the passive and active forces of monads are not parts of monads. Primitive forces of monads cannot 
be considered parts of anything.46 Forces are analyzed in terms of aggregation and point of view. 
Aggregation and point of view are the ontological equivalents of harmony and unity. These two 
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foundational themes coincide in the corporeal substance, where the harmony of the elements 
results in unity. The unity of a corporeal substance is identical with the harmony of its elements. 
(This is one reason why I believe he actively courts the notion of the vinculum substantiale, since he 
is concerned with basing the unity of corporeal substance only in the pre-established harmony of 
God's plan—he wants to more fully account for the relatus ad of primitive force to the organic body. 
Nonetheless, I think this explanation is what he maintains, in spite of doubts about the project.)  
The monad itself is an active force, and this is never a part of a body, but the active 
principle of the body. Yet the monad from the bird's-eye view is passive, if it is in a collection. In 
either case, the monad is not a part—the parts of bodies are collections. Since monads are simple, 
they can only be aspects. An analogy might be that being the "head of a household" and being "a 
citizen" are not parts of a person, able to be unbuttoned and removed. Similarly, perhaps, the 
aspects of the monads in the body contribute to the corporeal substance, without being parts. They 
"come together" in secondary matter, which then contains monads, and from them the active and 
passive force of the body is derived. And these passive and active forces in the body correspond to 
the primary passive and active force of a single metaphysical point: the dominant monad. This shows 
that the elements can come together as a complete substance without being parts of the substance. 
The mass which contains primary matter is given unity through the single point of view of a 
metaphysical point, the dominant monad or soul. Primary matter is everywhere the same because 
it is merely "that which is acted upon." Like Aristotle, it is potentiality.47 For Leibniz the 
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potentiality (or matter) is defined in terms of other substances. As an element of a body a monad is 
acted upon, insofar as it belongs to secondary matter.  
There is only a body and soul after the elements have come together. The compound is an 
irreducible unity (following the definition of unity given in the previous section), since a body 
without a soul is a mere aggregate, nothing more than a phenomenon, and a soul without a body 
is at best an incomplete simple substance, a bare principle of change. It is interesting that he 
confesses to Des Bosses, that souls are substances, but not points: 
Many years ago, when my philosophy was still too immature, I located souls in points and 
thus thought that the multiplication of souls could be explained through traduction, since 
many points can be made out of a single point, as the vertices of many triangles can be 
made through division from the vertex of one. . . . Properties pertaining to extension are 
not to be assigned to souls, and their unity and multitude are not to be derived from the 
category of quantity but from the category of substance, that is, not from points but from 
the primitive force of action.48 
 
This passage may be trying if approached from a purely Phenomenalist viewpoint, for even though 
Leibniz identifies souls as substance, he admits that "many years ago" he was incorrect to say they 
are points. Simples, however, are usually identified as metaphysical points, or atoms (he usually 
draws an analogy between points and lines). Because Leibniz identifies soul as primitive active 
force, this locates it as an aspect of a corporeal substance. Insofar as it is as substance, it cannot be 
identified as a part. It is only a soul when the substance is complete; but once in the unity of a 
corporeal substance, the monads result in a body and soul. This is crucial for understanding one 
role phenomena play in his system. When considering the "parts" of a corporeal substance we find 
that a body without a soul is not even a body. It is only a phenomenon, and therefore a body 
                                                
          48. Leibniz to Des Bosses, 30 April 1709, Papers and Letters, 599. 
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(without a soul) cannot be a part more simple than the unity. Likewise, the soul apart from the 
body is a mere principle or idea, or an incomplete simple, so it would have no reality. Body and 
soul reify one another, and taken apart they no longer exist. The parts of a corporeal substance are, 
indeed, no simpler than the whole to which they contribute. This is why, I believe, phenomena 
play such an important role in his system, since they help illuminate the true unity of corporeal 
substance. 
 
A NEW SYSTEM? 
 
If Leibniz does indeed hold to the reality of corporeal substances, as I have argued, then we 
must rethink the structure of his system. His vision of nature spans an entire range, from the 
Divine Author of all things, to individuals amid the smallest details of life, to the appearances of 
each to each in space and time, replete with color and motion. The plenum teems with vitality, 
fully harmonized and fully individuated. At the bottom of it all, nature is rational. Revealing the 
intricacies of this rational system, in any satisfactory manner, are beyond the scope of this project, 
but I think a general direction can be plotted, and a basic outline provided. 
I propose that Leibniz's system can be interpreted as having three-tiers, like a three-tiered 
city, with corporeal substances at the ontological center.49 This will allow us to account for simple 
substances, corporeal substances, and real or well-founded phenomena. These are all important 
                                                
          49. A three-tiered understanding of Leibniz has been suggested elsewhere, though with a different 
partitioning of the "regions." See for example, Glenn Hartz and J. A. Cover, "Space and Time in the 
Leibnizian Metaphysic," Nous 22 (1988): 493-519. 
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aspects of nature for Leibniz. My motivation for this three-tiered view is partly grounded in the 
following passage from the New System, where he talks of three kinds of points, which I think signify 
three levels of reality. Catherine Wilson, furthermore, notes that he uses this framework to 
differentiate corporeal substances from simple substances.50 
It is only atoms of substance, that is to say, real unities absolutely devoid of parts, that can be 
the sources of actions, and the absolute first principles of the composition of things, and as it 
were the ultimate elements in the analysis of substances [substantial things]. They might be 
called metaphysical points; they have something of the nature of life and a kind of perception, and 
mathematical points are their point of view for expressing the universe. But when a corporeal 
substance is contracted, all its organs together make what to us is only a physical point. Thus 
the indivisibility of physical points is only apparent. Mathematical points really are 
indivisible, but they are only modalities. It is only metaphysical or substantial points 
(constituted by forms or souls) which are both indivisible and real, and without them there 
would be nothing real, since without true unities there would be no multiplicity.51 
 
This passage (partially quoted earlier) contains a great deal of what I think Leibniz 
envisions to be the structure of reality. He begins with the now familiar "atoms of substance," 
which are "absolutely destitute of parts." These are the sources of all action and the absolute first 
principles of compound things. He calls them "metaphysical points," in that they are wholly 
indivisible real unities. I think Leibniz was deeply impressed with the "Gassendists" (that is, the 
"corpuscularians" who held that reality was composed of atoms and a void), since it seemed to have 
an important part to play in physics. He was impressed, and as usual he thought there was a great 
deal of truth in it.52 But he eventually concludes that physical atoms make no sense (as we 
discussed earlier) because (1) what is physical is by nature extended, and therefore has parts, so 
                                                
          50. Wilson, Leibniz's Metaphysics, 186. 
          51. New System, ibid., 149. 
          52. "In my youth I agreed with Democritus (and also with Gassendi and Descartes, who in this 
respect are his followers)." See  Specimen Dynamicum, in Texts, 161. 
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there would be no sufficient reason for there to be a smallest physical atom having no parts; and 
(2) since all these physical atoms are all the same on the inside, they have no individuality—so it is 
incoherent, for (at least) these two reasons, to talk about physical atoms. His solution was to push 
these atoms back deeper into the foundations, rendering them metaphysical (rather than physical), 
and to endow them with an internal basis from which they can be distinguished. They all have the 
same sorts of qualities inside, in that they all perceive, and have "appetites" that allow for changes 
of perception. But these metaphysical atoms are distinguished from one another based on their 
point of view, which is dictated by what they distinctly perceive (they each perceive everything, so 
the difference is the distinctness of their perceptions). Point of view is in the above passage 
equated with the mathematical point, and it implies singularity, as well as place. It is placed in a 
body. Without bodies, there are no points of view, and without points of view there are no bodies. 
My concern right now is with these three points: metaphysical, mathematical, and physical. 
Because of this neat division he offers, I want to follow him into a three-tiered reality, with each 
level having their own kind of corpuscle, as it were. Simple substances are in the foundations. As 
we saw above, simples naturally aggregate and complete one another, with the more perfect 
"dominating" the less perfect in an aggregate. The act itself brings about the unity of the corporeal 
substance, when there is a single point of view to which the elements of the aggregate correspond. 
Only then is this a corporeal substance, with a body and soul (otherwise the body is not even a 
body, but is merely phenomenal). This is the second level or tier of nature, in which points of view 
are contained in bodies, thereby producing corporeal substance. That nature is full of points of 
view implies that nature is full of mathematical points to which every body corresponds. And this 
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can provide a geometric structure for the relations of bodies. On this level we do not have simple 
substances, but form and matter, or body and soul. The soul is the point of view of a body, and it 
is through the point of view (as a single perceiving force) that a body is able to relate to, and be 
differentiated from, all other bodies. 
Mathematical points act as limit concepts—so he writes in the beginning of the New System 
that mathematical points are "the extremities of extended things, and mere modifications."53 These 
are the limits between bodies, where one ends and another begin. Neither the metaphysical nor 
mathematical point can be divided, but the former is real and the latter is a mode. In contrast, 
physical points are real, but only appear indivisible. And so, each level of reality has its own 
"corpuscle," which arises from a lower level. But simple substances are absolute. 
Wilson notes that metaphysical points are "less than God, but more than the infinity of the 
universe which it encompasses."54 If it were less than the infinity of the universe (that is, the body 
which it makes one), it could not act, but would be passive. Leroy Loemker remarks that there are 
spatial correlates for the three kinds of points: "perceptual space to physical points, conceptual 
space to mathematical points, and the complex harmony of representational perspectives or points 
of view to metaphysical points."55 Each level of reality can be said to have its own point, and in a 
manner, its own continuum. On the monadic level, the first tier of the city, are the perceivers. 
These are the metaphysical points. Their perceptions are not caused by anything outside of them, 
but are brought about by their own inner processes. These have been harmonized from the 
                                                
          53. New System, in Texts, 145. 
          54. Ibid. 
          55. Papers and Letters, 461. 
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foundation of the world, so that each perceiver is in agreement with every other. With a point of 
view the atoms of substance have definite yet changing relations to one another and are the souls 
or entelechies, the forms as well as the elements of bodies. Point of view is an individuating 
quality, since no two metaphysical points can simultaneously be the same mathematical point. 
Since point of view is differentiating, and a mathematical point is a point of view, then the 
mathematical point is a limit concept. Mathematical points, though, are not real, but relational 
(perhaps we may say a real relation), in that such a point is a nexus for relating to everything else. 
The soul or entelechy (which is what has the point of view, or mathematical point) relates its body 
to all other bodies. This second tier of reality—which is body and soul—arises from the relations 
and limits among simples. It is their harmony which results in corporeal substances.  
The third tier of reality is the physical world as it is experienced and scientifically 
understood. It is the level of phenomena, both real and imaginary. Donald Rutherford suggests 
that "the category of phenomenon is for [Leibniz] one of ontology rather than psychology."56 
Bodies, even as phenomena, are still real (though Adams would say they are real in a "weak sense") 
and not simply mental constructs. Just as the phenomenalist position claims, they have an elevated 
metaphysical status. Thus, when Leibniz talks of phenomena, he does not mean to strip the subject 
of ontological standing. He is rather explaining it in ontological terms. A real phenomenon has to 
do with regularity, vividness, and agreement, and these are, for Leibniz, hallmarks of ontology, not 
psychology. This is the level of physical qualities, which are in fact the appearances of bodies. But 
                                                
          56. Donald Rutherford, "Leibniz and the Problem of Monadic Aggregation", Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie 76/1 (1994): 70. 
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we are mistaken to say that these properties are in the objects themselves. This would undoubtedly 
be a confusion of category. He writes: 
A man who observes a green color in a powdered mixture no longer sees it as green when 
his eye is aided by an instrument but as a mixture of yellow and blue and can grasp the 
causes of these two colors with the use of better instruments and other observations or 
reasons. From these considerations it seems that no such thing [as green] exists outside of 
us, the phantasm of which appears to our imagination. We are commonly like boys who 
have been convinced that there is a pot of gold at the very end of the rainbow where it 
touches the earth and who run toward it in a vain effort to find it.57 
 
In an earlier draft of this passage Leibniz wrote, "Meanwhile, we are right in saying that 
colors and heat are in things, when we mean by this the foundations of these phenomena."58 
Again, he points to something beyond the phenomena, to something that grounds the appearance, 
to which the appearance belongs. There are the foundations for our phenomena. Nonetheless he 
is concerned with the relation of physical properties to things, and his concern is that of the 
scientist as well as the metaphysician. As Garber notes, Leibniz is grounding color in something 
"metaphysically more basic."59 The phenomenal level is real and constitutes an important part of 
nature. The regularity, vividness and motion of the world are experienced, and these are the 
appearances of the deeper truths of reality. The properties are not in things but belong to them, as 
all true phenomena belong to the bodies of corporeal substances. 
The exact line between phenomena and substance cannot be drawn here, for it would 
constitute the beginning of a much bigger project; it would force an examination of the nature of 
space and time. This is indeed where physics and metaphysics intersect, and the primary forces and 
                                                
          57. Critical Thoughts on the General Part of the Principles of Descartes 1692, in Papers and Letter, 390-391. 
          58. Ibid. 
          59. Garber and Rauzy, "Leibniz on Body, Matter and Extension," 36. 
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derived forces of substances produce the effects of time and space—none of which are absolute but 
relative to the points of view of substances. Accordingly, Leibniz defines extension, space and time 
in the following way: 
In conceiving of extension we are conceiving of an order among coexistences; but we should 
not think of it, any more than space, as though it were a substance. It is like time, which 
presents to the mind only an order of changes.60 
 
And again: 
 
I hold that time, extension, motion, and in general all forms of continuity as dealt with in 
mathematics, are only ideal things: that is to say, that, just like numbers, they express 
possibilities. In the same way, Hobbes defined space as phantasma existentis. But to speak 
more accurately, extension is the order of possible coexistences, just as time is the order of 
inconsistent but nevertheless connected possibilities, such that these orders relate not only 
to what is actual, but also to what could be put in its place, just as numbers.61 
 
Thus, in so far as space and time are the logical or mathematical orderings of real things, 
they are not themselves real. They are relational, or ideal, but not "out there" (that is, not wholly 
apart from the perception of things). Indeed, since reality is a plenum of discrete individuals, 
without a void, the notion of space must be interpreted relationally, and not absolutely. There is no 
getting beyond the perceptions of things, for everything, every point and passive nook of reality, 
perceives. Every angle is a point of view. This secures the ontological importance of phenomena, 
since it obviates the need to posit some hovering Platonic Forms. The properties of bodies found 
in their appearances express the deeper level of real changes taking place, as all relations in the 
universe shift to accommodate the changing nature of one to the whole. And so for each 
                                                
          60. Leibniz to Bayle, 1698, Texts, 207. 
          61. Reply to Bayle's Note L, 1702, Texts, 252-3. 
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individual substance, as it shifts to harmonize with the universe, phenomena also change to 
account for what "lies underneath." 
The ultimate line between the level of phenomena and the level of corporeal substances is 
caught in the mix of time and space, and I will not venture to untangle the two. Perhaps they 
cannot be disentwined, and we must simply think of them as parallel tracks that express the same 
reality. And this is what, in essence, he says: "Souls act according to the laws of final causes, 
through appetition, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes, or of 
motions. And these two realms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in mutual 
harmony."62 But of course, this pronouncement puts both sets of laws squarely in corporeal 
substances. Body and soul act according to different laws, yet both are contained in the same unity. 
Since corporeal substances unite final and efficient laws, they at once reflect the unity and 
harmony of God's plan, and in this sense they comprise the ontological center of his system.
                                                
          62. Monadology, in Texts, 279. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
I have tried to show that the Phenomenalist's interpretation is difficult to 
maintain. There is too much textual evidence to the contrary, and Leibniz does in fact 
hold to the reality of corporeal substances. When we analyze what Leibniz says about real 
phenomena, we find he does not imply that bodies are only phenomena. In fact, aggregates 
of corporeal substances are what make phenomena real, and therefore, they must have 
more reality than do phenomena. According to the Phenomenalist, corporeal substances 
are to be analyzed as aggregates of monads; but the problem is that corporeal substances 
are not aggregates. Since they make phenomena real, and they cannot be reduced to 
aggregates, they must themselves be real substances. Furthermore, the Phenomenalist 
position stands on the principle that only simple substances exist. However, Leibniz seems 
to base his commitment to simples on the prior commitment to corporeal substances. 
This undermines the argument for Phenomenalism. 
I have also tried to give an account of the unity of corporeal substances, as based in 
the harmony of its elements. Leibniz defines unity as that which has no parts more simple 
than the whole. Corporeal substances are the union of body and soul. Yet, when we 
consider a body without a soul, we are left with nothing but a heap or a phenomenon 
(and so it is important that Leibniz stresses the difference between true unity and mere 
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phenomenon). The soul, when considered apart from the body, is simple but incomplete 
(perhaps not even individuated). Insofar as it belongs to a corporeal substance, it is a 
principle of life, and not truly a substance. The monads that come together in the 
corporeal substance do so according to their active and passive principles, in terms of 
aggregation and unity. These are not parts, but they result in the parts, that is, in the body 
and soul of the corporeal substance. If there were a way to divide the corporeal substance, 
to take the body away from the soul, then there would not be body over here and soul 
over there. There would only be aggregates of simple monads, incomplete in themselves. 
This result, I think, should bring with it a new assessment of Leibniz's 
metaphysical system. I suggest that he can be interpreted in terms of a three-tiered model, 
where simple substances are the ultimate causes of things, the metaphysical points from 
which all composites are built. From the interaction of simples (i.e., their harmonized 
independent activities) result corporeal substances, as a union of body and soul—and it is 
body and soul that are the second tier. They require monads, yet are not reducible to 
them. The soul and body, however, operate under their own separate laws. This serves to 
put corporeal substances right at the heart of Leibniz's ontology, since they combine both 
final and efficient causes, and embody the two great principles of nature—unity and 
harmony. 
Of course, there are some questions that arise from this interpretation. For 
example, the system I propose is a mere sketch.  The nature of bodily interaction would 
need to be discussed at length, as well as the relationship of phenomena to bodies and 
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corporeal substances. The intersection of physics and metaphysics, as it pertains to 
Leibniz's notions of primary and derived forces is crucial to cohering the phenomenal and 
corporeal levels of this model. There is much left unexplained, and I merely cast in 
outline. But something like it is needed, if what I have argued is correct. 
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